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PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

A. Powers, Functions and Jurisdiction of the Board
Under section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act),'
"The Board is empowered. . . to prevent any person from engaging in
By passing
".."2
any unfair labor practice . . .affecting commerce .
the Act, "Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the fullest
jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Commerce
Clause." 3 Thus, only when the volume of business affecting commerce
is de minimis will courts refuse to uphold the Board's assertion of
jurisdiction. 4 However, because of limitations on time and money, the
Board has never exercised its statutory jurisdiction to the fullest extent. 5
Instead, from the time of its inception in 1935, the Board has consistently
exercised jurisdiction only over those "enterprises whose operations
have, or at which labor disputes would have, a pronounced impact upon
the flow of interstate commerce.'"6 Prior to 1950, jurisdiction was determined on a case by case basis. 7 In October, 1950, the Board started to
define in its decisions those classes and categories of employers over
which it would decline to assert jurisdiction. 8 Congress implicitly acknowledged the propriety of this Board practice by adding subsection
14(c)(1) 9 to the Act in 1959.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970).
2. Id. The terms "commerce" and "affecting commerce" are defined in id. § 152(6)
and (7), respectively.
3. NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224,226 (1963). See U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
8, cl.3. Therefore, it is not necessary that an employer actually be engaged in interstate
commerce for the Board to have jurisdiction over the employer's operations. NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 7 (1937).
4. NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
5. HPO Serv., Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 394, 394, 43 L.R.R.M. 1127, 1127 (1958). See
Tropicana Prods., Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 121, 123, 43 L.R.R.M. 1077, 1078 (1958);Jonesboro
Grain Drying Coop., 110 N.L.R.B. 481, 482, 35 L.R.R.M. 1038, 1039 (1954).
6. Jonesboro Grain Drying Coop., 110 N.L.R.B. 481, 482, 35 L.R.R.M. 1038, 1039
(1954). See HPO Serv., Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 394, 394, 43 L.R.R.M. 1127, 1127 (1958).
7. HPO Serv., Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 394, 394, 43 L.R.R.M. 1127, 1127 (1958).
8. Id. See, e.g., Federal Dairy Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 638,26 L.R.R.M. 1938 (1950); Hollow
Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 635, 26 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1950); Dorn's House of Miracles,
Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 632, 26 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1950); Stanislaus Implement & Hardwhre Co.,
91 N.L.R.B. 618, 26 L.R.R.M. 1548 (1950).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970). This subsection was added to the Act as part of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 701(a),
73 Stat. 541 (1959), and reads in pertinent part:
The Board, in its discretion, may . . . decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor
dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion of the
Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to
warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to
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The Ninth Circuit dealt with jurisdictional issues in two cases during

the survey period: NLRB v. Anthony Co.1 0 and NLRB v. Timberland
Packing Corp. " In Anthony, the Board asserted jurisdiction over a card
parlor which operated pursuant to local ordinances in Gardena, California, and it found the parlor operator guilty of several unfair labor

practices. 2 When the Board petitioned the court for enforcement, the
operator argued that the Board had abused its discretion in asserting
jurisdiction over the gaming establishment. It was conceded that, by
virtue of section 10(a) of the Act, 13 the Board possessed the power to

assert jurisdiction over the operator. Instead, the argument revolved
around the propriety of the Board's assertion of its 14(c)(1)14 discretionary jurisdiction. The operator pointed out that the Board has consistently
refused to assert jurisdiction over racetracks.1 5 He then contended that,
for jurisdictional purposes, card parlors and racetracks are indistinguishable.
The court rejected this argument. It pointed out that the Board is free to

exercise its statutory jurisdiction as it sees fit, 6 unless the assertion of
jurisdiction over one industry and not another results in substantial
prejudice or unjust discrimination. 17 In light of the significant differences
between racetracks and the card parlor in question,' 8 the court ruled that
the Board's assertion of jurisdiction over Anthony Company's establish-

ment was neither unjust nor prejudicial.
assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the
standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
Id.
10. 557 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1977).
11. 550 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 397 (1977).
12. The Board's decision and order are reported at 220 N.L.R.B. 886, 90 L.R.R.M.
1373 (1975).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970). See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
14. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970). See note 9 supra.
15. See 29 C.F.R. § 103.3 (1976). See, e.g., Walter A. Kelley, 139 N.L.R.B. 744, 51
L.R.R.M. 1375 (1962); Meadow Stud, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1202, 47 L.R.R.M. 1467 (1961);
Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 388, 45 L.R.R.M. 1106 (1959).
16. 557 F.2d at 695. See NLRB v. Timberland Packing Corp., 550 F.2d 500, 501 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 397 (1977); NLRB v. Carroll-Naslund Disposal, Inc., 359 F.2d
779, 780 (9th Cir. 1966).
17. NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 362 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
915 (1967).
18. The following differences were noted or implied by the court: (1) the card parlor in
question was operated in conjunction with a restaurant engaged in interstate commerce,
whereas racetracks have little impact on interstate commerce; (2) the "work force"
employed by the company was stable in comparison with those employed by racetracks;
thus, the assertion of jurisdiction over the card parlor would, arguably, contribute to
stability in labor relations, whereas an assertion of jurisdiction over racetracks would not;
and (3) the local regulations which governed the operation of the card parlor did not
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In NLRB v. Timberland Packing Corp.,19 a controversy arose
concerning the Board's computation of Timberland's annual purchases
and sales. This computation was necessary to determine whether the
Board should assert jurisdiction over the company. 20 The company argued that the Board's selection of the company's most recent fiscal year

as the sample by which the Board would determine the annual volume of
Timberland's interstate business was unjust and discriminatory. Business
during that year was abnormally prosperous and, consequently, not
representative of the company's usual volume of interstate transactions.
The court quickly disposed of this argument by declaring that the use
of an objective test (i.e., interstate business volume during the most
recent fiscal year), rather than one resting upon a company's subjective
prediction of future or normal sales volume, is not arbitrary or discriminatory. 2' To the contrary, "The representative year standard used
by the Board was in conformity with its current practice and was not
discriminatorily applied.''22
Under section 10(b) of the Act, 23 the Board has no power to issue a
complaint based upon an unfair labor practice that occurred more than six
months before a charge was filed with the Board and a copy of the charge
was served upon the alleged wrongdoer. NLRB v. Local 30, Internation-

al Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union24 involved the question of

"address the matter of labor relations, and thus they [did] not render the Board's
involvement unnecessary or redundant." 557 F.2d at 695.
19. 550 F.2d 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 397 (1977).
20. Present Board standards declare that jurisdiction will be asserted over non-retail
establishments, such as Timberland Packing Corp., when they have annual inflow (purchases) or outflow (sales) of at least $50,000. See Andover Protective Serv., Inc., 225
N.L.R.B. 435, 92 L.R.R.M. 1512 (1976); Siemons Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 43
L.R.R.M. 1056 (1958).
21. 550 F.2d at 502.
22. Id. See McSweeney & Sons, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 1399, 1401, 41 L.R.R.M. 1309,
1310 (1958) (proper for Board to use calendar year as opposed to fiscal year); Burton
Beverage Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 634, 635, 38 L.R.R.M. 1311, 1311 (1956) ("The Board bases
its jurisdictional standards on an employer's business during the most recent calendar or
fiscal year .... ."); Aroostock Fed'n of Farmers, Inc., 114 N.L.R.B. 538, 539, 36
L.R.R.M. 1611, 1611 (1955) ("[T]he Board . . .has heretofore uniformly relied on the
experience of an employer during the most recent calendar or fiscal year . . .
23. Section 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970), reads in pertinent part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any ...
unfair labor practice, the Board. . .shall have power to issue and cause to be served
upon such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a
notice of hearing before the Board or a member thereof . . . : Provided, That no
complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy
thereof upon the person against whom such charge is made . .

Id.
24. 549 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1977).

..
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when that six-month period begins to run.
The facts of the case were as follows:25 Livingston was an employee of
U.S. Borax and Chemical Corporation at the Boron, California plant. He
was a member of Local 30 when the latter began an economic strike
against Borax on June 14, 1974. On June 27, 1974, the union began
picketing all plant entrances, including one designated "RestrictedContractors Gate." That gate was used only by independent contractors
engaged in construction work at the plant and not by Borax's regular
employees. Borax filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board,
alleging that the union was in violation of the secondary boycott provisions of the Act.26 The Board obtained an order enjoining2 7 the union
from picketing in front of the contractors' gate. The union began to
comply on July 23, 1974, and the unfair labor practice charge was
dismissed. Prior to July 23, 1974, however, the requirements of Livingston's interim employment made it necessary for him to utilize the
contractors' gate and cross the union's picket line there. In August, 1974,
Livingston resigned from the union and returned to work at Borax.
On September 17, 1974, the union voted to impose a fine of $3,150
upon Livingston for crossing its picket line the previous spring. Notice of
the fine was mailed to Livingston the next day. He claimed, however,
that the notice was never received and that he did not learn of the
imposition of the fine until the following March, when the union's
counsel demanded payment. Shortly thereafter, on March 18, 1975,
Livingston filed an unfair labor practice charge against the union alleging
that the imposition of the fine violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act28 in
light of the fact that the picket line had been illegal. The union was
notified of the charge by registered mail the next day.
The Board issued an order requiring the union to revoke the fine,2 9 and
the union petitioned the court for review. It argued that under the
Supreme Court's holding in Local 1424, InternationalAssociation of
Machinists v. NLRB,30 the six-month time period specified in section
25. A complete recitation of the facts may be found in the Board's decision, reported at
223 N.L.R.B. 1257, 92 L.R.R.M. 1282 (1976).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970). Under this section, it is unlawful for a union to exert
pressure upon individual employees or employers with the objective of effecting an
unlawful hot cargo agreement, secondary boycott or work assignment. See, e.g., Local
761, Int'l Union of Electrical Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961);
Nashville Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 172 N.L.R.B. 1138, 68 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1968).
27. The Board is empowered to seek and obtain injunctive relief in secondary boycott
cases. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
28. Id. § 158(b)(1)(A).
29. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1264, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1282.
30. 362 U.S. 411 (1960). In Local 1424, the Court held that where an otherwise lawful
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10(b) of the Act commenced on September 17, when the union voted to
upon the
of the charge
service
argued,
3
impose the fine. Thus, it was not
I
timely.
was
1975
19,
March
on
union
The court, adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Local 1104,
Communications Workers of America v. NLRB,32 held that when the
imposition of a union penalty constitutes an unfair labor practice, the
section 10(b) statute of limitations begins to run not when the penalty is
imposed, but when "the laborer was [first] in a position to file the unfair
labor practice charge, ' ' 33 i.e., when the laborer receives actual or
constructive notice of the penalty. 34 .The court pointed out that, were it to
hold otherwise, a union could simply impose a penalty, wait six months
before notifying the penalized member, and be assured that its action
would be immune from Board scrutiny.35
act (e.g., a union disciplinary fine) is imbued with illegality only when considered in
conjunction with a prior unfair labor practice (e.g., a picket line constituting a secondary
boycott), then the six-month period within which a complaint based upon the otherwise
legal act may be issued commences with the occurrence of the unfair labor practice. Id. at
419. Thus, in Local 1424, the date upon which the illegal collective bargaining agreement
was executed triggered the six-month period within which complaints based upon the
subsequent enforcement of that agreement could be issued.
It is not clear just how the union in Local 30 relies on Local 1424, since the latter would
not seem to apply to situations where the otherwise legal act itself occurred more than six
months prior to the service of a complaint based thereon. Indeed, section 10(b) clearly
bars complaints in such situations. The court's terse discussion of Local 1424 sheds no
light on the union's strategy.
31. In computing the beginning and ending dates of the six-month period, the day upon
which the act or event commencing the period occurs is not included. The last day of the
period is included, unless it falls on a Sunday or a legal holiday. 29 C.F.R. § 102.114
(1976). See Environmental Control Sys., 190 N.L.R.B. 594, 594 n.2 (1971). The union
apparently argued that the last day on which it could have been served with notice of the
charge was March 18, 1975.
32. 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
33. 549 F.2d at 700-01.
34. In Local 1104, the receipt by the complainant of notice of the union's action against
him (its refusal to admit him as a member) played no part in the decision. But the general
approach taken by the court, that the six-month period does not commence until the
complainant is in a position to complain of the unfair labor practice, supports the ruling in
Local 30. See NLRB v. Plumbers & Pipe Fitters Local 214, 298 F.2d 427 (7th Cir. 1962)
(although union committed unfair labor practice when it requested employer to discharge
non-union member, six-month statute did not commence until member was in position to
complain, i.e., when he learned of the union's action at his discharge). Cf. Local 1424,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960) (complainant was in position to
file charge from the moment the unfair labor practice occurred and continuously
thereafter).
35. In another case, it was held that an employer's statement that he would comply with
a collective bargaining agreement on union jobs but not on non-union jobs constituted
only a partial repudiation of the contract and was insufficient to start the section 10(b)
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In Mt. Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB, 36 a key issue presented was the

extent to which the Board is empowered to prevent and remedy unfair
labor practices occurring during the course of a ship's voyage. The

controversy arose when the ship's captain required Lial, a member of the
crew, to take part in a "logging" 3 7 without the presence of a union
representative. The administrative law judge ruled that the captain had
violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act,38 and the Board, relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc. , agreed.n0

The court of appeals distinguished Weingarten41 and denied enforcement of the Board order. Additionally, it declared that even if the logging

was characterized as an investigatory interview as that term is used in
Weingarten,42 the captain still would not have been guilty of a section 8
violation since the section 7 right to union representation at such an
interview "cannot be said to exist in the maritime context that we have
here. "43 The court observed that the usual employer-employee relation-

ship does not exist during the course of a ship's voyage.' Consequently,
the Board's power to regulate labor relationships existing during such a

voyage is limited:
statute of limitations. NLRB v. R.O. Pyle Roofing Co., 560 F.2d 1370, 1372 (9th Cir.
1977).
36. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977).
37. "Logging" is a statutorily mandated proceeding in which a seaman is given notice
of entries in the ship's log relating to the misconduct with which he is charged. See 46
U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
39. 420 U.S. 251 (1975). In Weingarten, the Court upheld a Board interpretation of § 7
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Specifically, the Board had construed the clause
granting employees the right to engage in "concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or
protection." The Court interpreted § 7 to provide for the "right in an employee to refuse
to submit without union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may
" 420 U.S. at 256.
result in his discipline ....
40. The Board's decision and order are reported at 218 N.L.R.B. 1423, 89 L.R.R.M.
1793 (1975).
41. The court noted that the Weingarten right applied only in those situations where the
employee reasonably believed that the investigatory interview to which he was subjected
would result in disciplinary action. 549 F.2d at 574. See NLRB v. J.Weingarten, Inc., 420
U.S. at 257. Thus Weingarten was not applicable to the case at hand since "[a] logging is
not an interview instigated for the purpose of ascertaining whether an offense has been
committed. It occurs after that question has been settled to the captain's satisfaction."
549 F.2d at 575. See also 46 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Logging was characterized as a
notification proceeding; Weingarten is applicable only to investigatory and disciplinary
proceedings. 549 F.2d at 575.
42. See note 41 supra.
43. 549 F.2d at 575.
44. Id.
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A charge of seaman disobedience during the course of a voyage is
not an assertion of "economic power" on the part of an employer; it
does not involve the ongoing struggle between labor and management in which the Board appropriately can intervene in an effort to
redress perceived imbalances. .
favor of the master of the ship.

.

.The unquestioned imbalance in
exists in the public interest and

. .

pursuant to statute, and it does not lie with the Board
to seek to
45
achieve equality of power under these circumstances.
The court effectively buttressed its position by quoting from the
Supreme Court's decision in Southern Steamship Co. v. NLRB, 46 a case
which involved a sit-down strike on board a United States vessel docked
in a United States port. The Supreme Court, in holding that the strike was
not protected under the Act, stated that "the Board has not been commissioned to effectuate the policies of the Labor Relations Act so singlemindedly that it may wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives. "'I Thus, as between the right to representation delineated in Weingarten and the necessity of maintaining safety and order
aboard United States vessels, "the policies reflected by the provisions of
title 46 with reference to the relationship between master and seaman
during the course of a sea voyage must be held to control." 48 The Board
has no power to rule otherwise.
B.

Board Procedure

The NLRB is free to fashion its own procedures so as to achieve the
goals of the National Labor Relations Act, i.e., so as to afford protection
from unfair labor practices. 49 Thus, the Board has the responsibility, in
the first instance, of determining whether full discovery is appropriate in
unfair labor practice hearings. 50 The Board's discovery rules formed the
basis of the controversy in Harvey's Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. NLRB. 51 In
that case, the Ninth Circuit joined the First,52 Second,53 Third,54 and
45. Id. (emphasis added).
46. 316 U.S. 31 (1942) (5-4 decision).
47. Id.at 47.
48. 549 F.2d at 576.
49. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 253 (1944).
50. North Am. Rockwell Corp. v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 866, 871 (10th Cir. 1968); NLRB v.
Vapor Blast Mfg. Co., 287 F.2d 402, 407 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 823 (1961).
51. 550 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1976).
52. See, e.g., Goodfriend W. Corp. v. Fuchs, 535 F.2d 145 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 895 (1976).
53. See, e.g., Title Guar. Co. v. NLRB, 534 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
834 (1976).
54. See, e.g., Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1976).
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Tenth55 Circuits in ruling that employees' statements obtained by the

56
Board are exempt from disclosure during enforcement proceedings
57
under section (7)(A) of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

The plaintiffs-employers were several Nevada hotels, restaurants, and

casinos which were being investigated by the Board following the filing
of unfair labor practice charges by the employees' union. The Board,
following its usual* procedure, interviewed and took affidavits from
various union members, many of whom were employees of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs then sought disclosure of these affidavits under the FOIA. 58
The court noted that the Board maintains a practice of investigating
unfair labor practice charges by securing affidavits from witnesses,
including employees. It recognized that most witnesses, particularly
employee-witnesses, are reluctant to provide information absent guarantees of strict confidentiality. Therefore, the court found a basis for
concluding that "disclosure of employee statements, at least, would
'interfere with enforcement proceedings' and that such statements therefore are exempt from the FOIA under exemption (7)(A)." 59 The court
declared:
[T]here can be no doubt that revelation of the employees' statements
. . .would harm the Board's case by causing a retarding effect on
open and frank Board investigations of alleged unfair labor practices. This would undermine labor policy as well as unduly broaden
the scope of the FOIA. To prevent, this result, employees' state60
ments must be protected in their entirety under exemption (7)(A).
55. See, e.g., Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 539 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1976).
56. Compare Harvey's Wagon Wheel with Roger J. Au & Son, Inc. v. NLRB, 538 F.2d
80, 83 (3d Cir. 1976) (statements of employees and witnesses exempt from disclosure but
can be obtained for cross examination of witness after he has testified). See also Deering
Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1135 & n.6 (4th Cir. 1977) (Harvey's Wagon Wheel
distinguished on grounds that it involved enforcement proceedings as opposed to back pay
proceedings).
57. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A) (Supp. V 1975). This subdivision provides in pertinent part:
"This section [requiring disclosure of agency documents] does not apply to matters that
are-(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would (A) interfere with enforcement proceedings.

. . ."

Id.

58. Under Board rules, all disclosure is forbidden except certain public documents and
case records, formal depositions of witnesses, statements of witnesses after they have
testified, and disclosure mandated by the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.
29 C.F.R. §§ 102.30, 102.117, 102.118 (1976). It is the responsibility of the Board to
formulate its own discovery rules. Harvey's Wagon Wheel, 550 F.2d at 1141 n.3; Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631, 635 (9th Cir. 1969). Thus, under the
circumstances, reliance on the FOIA was the employers' only hope of obtaining prehearing disclosure of affidavits.
59. 550 F.2d at 1142.
60. Id.
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Pursuing the same line of reasoning, the court suggested that, in
addition to the protection against disclosure of employees' statements,
"[s]tatements of union representatives and agents of the employee...

should normally be protected from disclosure as a matter of law.''61

However, the court refused to rule that statements by all non-employees
should, as a matter of law, also be exempt from disclosure. 62 Instead, the
case was remanded for a determination of whether, under the circumstances, such statements also fell within one of the subsection 552(b)(7)
exemptions.
In NLRB v. InternationalAssociation ofBridge Workers Local 433,63
the court held that the findings of a proceeding under section 10(k) of the
Act64 may be used as evidence, subject to refutation, in a subsequent
hearing to determine whether a section 8(b)(4)(D) 65 violation has occurred. "When these findings are not contradicted.

. .they may be the

sole basis for a subsequent finding."66

The union had argued that the use of findings from the 10(k) proceed-

ing as an evidentiary basis for a subsequent determination that section
8(b)(4)(D) was violated was improper for two reasons: (1) it was in
violation of section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act 67 because no
hearing was held before an administrative law judge prior to the Board's
finding; and (2) the different standard of proof applicable to the 10(k)
hearing precluded the use of its findings in the subsequent unfair labor
61. Id. at 1143.
62. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
63. 549 F.2d 634 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 116 (1977).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1970). Essentially, this section empowers and directs the Board
to conduct a hearing within 10 days of the time a charge under § 158(b)(4)(D) (see note 65
infra) is filed. The purpose of this hearing is to quickly resolve the jurisdictional dispute
giving rise to the § 8(b)(4)(D) charge. NLRB v. Radio & Television Broadcast Eng'rs
Local 1212, 364 U.S. 573 (1961). If the parties in disagreement voluntarily resolve the
dispute prior to the Board's issuance of a 10(k) decision, the § 8(b)(4)(D) charge must be
dismissed. International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B. 759, 759-60, 45 L.R.R.M.
1184, 1184 (1959). If there has been no resolution, the Board is required to solve the
dispute (affirmatively award the work to one of the competing unions). Id.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(D) (1970). This section makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to use threats, coercion or restraint to compel an employer to assign particular work
to employees represented by that union rather than to employees represented by another
union (subject to an exception not relevant to the present discussion).
66. 549 F.2d at 638. Cf. NLRB v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 122 n.10 (1971)
(findings and conclusions in a 10(k) proceeding are not res judicata on the unfair labor
practice issue in the later § 8(b)(4)(D) determination). See also International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B. 759, 761, 45 L.R.R.M. 1184, 1185 (1959) (same).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). This section requires an "opportunity for an agency hearing"
in all cases involving an adjudication by the agency.
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practice proceeding. 68 In deciding against the union's first objection, the
court followed the Fifth Circuit 69 and the District of Columbia Circuit 7°

by holding that when no new evidence on an issue is presented at the
section 8(b)(4)(D) hearing, reliance on the findings of the 10(k) proceed-

ing is proper.7 This holding is in conformity with the modern trend,
which frowns upon "relitigating matters already resolved in a prior
setting." 72 Quoting from an earlier Ninth Circuit case, the court observed:
It is settled law that when no fact question is involved or the facts

are agreed, a plenary adversary administrative proceeding involving
evidence, cross-examination of witnesses, etc., is not obligatoryeven though a pertinent statute prescribes a hearing. In such situations, the rationale is that Congress does not intend administrative
agencies to perform meaningless tasks . . .73

In meeting the union's second objection (i.e., that the standard of
proof which had been utilized in the 10(k) hearing precluded a subse-

quent adoption of the findings and determinations made therein), the
court examined the language of the Board's decision and order. 74 This
examination revealed that "the Board did not simply rely on its previous
adjudication at the § 10(k) stage, but rather re-examined the record and
68. At a 10(k) proceeding, the Board need only find that there is reasonablecause to
believe that a section 8(b)(4)(D) violation has occurred. The level of proof required at a
subsequent section 8(b)(4)(D) violation hearing is a preponderanceof the evidence. NLRB
v. Plasterers' Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 122 n.10 (1971).
69. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1576, 409 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1969).
70. See Bricklayers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
71. The court stated that the "findings of a 10(k) proceeding may be used as evidence in
a subsequent hearing .... ." 549 F.2d at 638 (emphasis added). This language suggests
that the court is leaving unanswered the question of whether the 10(k) findings must be
relied upon in the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding. Cf. NLRB v. Plasterers'
Local 79, 404 U.S. 116, 122 n.10 (1971) ("The findings and conclusions in a 10(k)
proceeding are not res judicata on the unfair labor practice issue in the later § 8(b)(4)(D)
determination."); International Typographical Union, 125 N.L.R.B. 759, 761, 45
L.R.R.M. 1184, 1185 (1959) (same). But cf. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's
Ass'n Local 1576, 409 F.2d 709, 710 (5th Cir. 1969) (decision of trial examiner that
determinations of prior 10(k) hearing would control § 8 proceeding was proper); Local 3,
IBEW, 206 N.L.R.B. 423, 424, 84 L.R.R.M. 1371, 1372 (1973) (issues raised and litigated
in 10(k) hearing "may not be relitigated [in an 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding] absent newly
discovered or previously unavailable evidence or special circumstances").
72. 549 F.2d at 638. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 146, 161-62
(1941); NLRB v. Air Control Prods., 335 F.2d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 1964).
73. 549 F.2d at 638 (quoting United States v. Consolidated Mines & Smelting Co., 455
F.2d 432, 453 (9th Cir. 1971)).
74. The Board's decision and order are reported at 218 N.L.R.B. 848, 89 L.R.R.M.
1894 (1975).
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made independent findings with regard to the commission of unfair labor

practices by Respondent [the union]." 75 Thus, the court concluded that
the Board had not simply accepted the findings of the 10(k) proceeding
without question, but had in fact reexamined those findings in light of the
76
stricter burden of proof applicable to unfair labor practice proceedings.
C. Nature and Purpose of Board Orders
The Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices and formulate
orders which "effectuate the policies" of the National Labor Relations77
Act is a broad one, subject to only limited review by the courts.
Nevertheless, the courts have articulated certain basic standards to which
Board orders must conform. For example, the order must set forth the
relationship between the pending case and the remedy ordered. 78 This

requirement would seem to entail an explanation of the reasons behind
the Board's orders; and the Ninth Circuit so held in NLRB v. Pacific
Southwest Airlines .79 In that case, the Board petitioned the court 0 for
enforcement of a bargaining order 81 issued against Pacific Southwest
75. 549 F.2d at 638.
76. The Board's language strongly suggests that the 10(k) findings were not simply
accepted without question: "This undisputed evidence, which. . . is neither supplemented nor controverted in this proceeding, likewise establishes, and we find, that Respondent
had engaged in the conduct with an object proscribed by Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(D) of the Act,
in violation thereof." 218 N.L.R.B. at 849 (emphasis added). It was this language of the
Board that led the court to conclude that the "preponderance of the evidence" test had
been applied and satisfied in the unfair labor practice proceeding. 549 F.2d at 638.
Nowhere in the Board's decision, however, is it explicitly announced that such a test had
been applied. Cf. Local 3, IBEW, 206 N.L.R.B. 423,425 n.8, 84 L.R.R.M. 1371,1372 n.8
(1973) (in an 8(b)(4)(D) proceeding following a 10(k) hearing, the Board announced,
"Implicit herein, as in all unfair labor practice proceedings, is that our findings are based
upon a preponderance of the evidence."). One might conclude, however, that if the basis
of the Board's findings was truly "implicit," an explicit announcement of that fact would
have been unnecessary.
77. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215-16 (1969).
78. Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 973, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
79. 550 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1977).
80. The procedure by which the Board may petition a court of appeals for enforcement
of a Board order is set forth in § 10(e) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970). Essentially,
the Board is empowered "to petition any court of appeals of the United States. . .for the
enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order
..

d.

81. Under § 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970), the Board is granted broad
discretion in formulating remedies that will effectuate the policies of the Act with respect
to labor relations. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969). However,
since the election process is generally preferable to a bargaining order based on authorization cards, the Board's discretion in issuing bargaining orders has been carefully circumscribed by the Supreme Court. Id. See note 85 infra.
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Airlines (PSA).8 2 The order resulted from the Board's determination that
PSA had engaged in activities violative of subsections 8(a)(1) and (3) of

the Act. 83 These illegal activities began in June, 1971, when six of the
eight persons employed at PSA's printing and publications shop signed
authorization cards 84 designating the Lithographers and Photoengravers

International Union as their bargaining representative.
After concluding that the Board's bargaining order was appropriate
under the standards propounded by the United States Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. ,85 the court addressed itself to the problem

of the format in which such orders are issued. The court posed the
82. The bargaining order is reported at 201 N.L.R.B. 647, 82 L.R.R.M. 1298 (1973).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1970). This section specifies the practices which, when
engaged in by an employer (id. § 158 (a)) or by a labor organization (id. § 158(b)),
constitute unfair labor practices. Under subsection (a)(1), it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees" in their exercise of rights
guaranteed by § 7 of the Act, id. § 157. Under subsection (a)(3), so far as is here
relevant, it is unfair labor practice for an employer "to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" through discriminatory treatment of employees
with respect to hiring, tenure of employment or any other "term or condition of employment." Generally, any commission by an employer of a § 8(a)(3) unfair labor practice will
constitute an unfair labor practice under the more broadly defined § 8(a)(1) as well.
84. For a thorough discussion of the validity of authorization cards as a means through
which a labor organization may obtain recognition as an exclusive bargaining representative, see NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575,595-600 (1969). See Cumberland Shoe
Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. 1268, 54 L.R.R.M. 1233 (1963). See generally Lesnick, Establishment of Bargaining Rights Without an NLRB Election, 65 MICH. L. REV. 851 (1967);
Lewis, The Use and Abuse of Authorization Cards in Determining Union Majority, 16
LAB. L.J. 434 (1965).
85. 395 U.S. 575 (1969). In Gissel, the Court delineated the types of situations in which
non-election bargaining orders might be appropriate. The Court recognized that the impact
of an employer's unlawful conduct is frequently so severe that it cannot be dissipated, and
that a representation election under such circumstances would be invalid. At the same
time, bargaining orders based on authorization cards are ordinarily inferior to the election
process since signatures on such cards may be procured through misrepresentation or
coercion. With these competing concerns in mind, the Court recognized that an employer's wrongful conduct would fall into one of three categories. First, the conduct might be
"exceptional," i.e., it might constitute a blatant or outrageously unfair labor practice. In
such cases, bargaining orders would certainly be warranted. Second, the employer's
wrongful conduct might be "minor or less extensive" and have only a negligible impact on
the election process. Bargaining orders would be inappropriate in such situations. Third,
the conduct might be "less extraordinary" but nevertheless inhibitive of the election
process. These cases, too, would warrant bargaining orders. The Court concluded:
If the Board finds that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of
ensuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though
present, is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed through cards would,
on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue

Id. at 614-15.
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question, "Must the Board make specific findings and articulate its
reasons when issuing a bargaining order

. .

.?86 After acknowledging

that other circuits have also had a problem in determining the extent to
which the Board should be required, under the guidelines of Gissel, to
87
articulate the reasoning behind its decision to issue a bargaining order,
the court adopted the rationale of the Seventh Circuit. The court quoted
from Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB,8 a case in which the Board
was castigated for failing to give a satisfactory explanation of its decision
to issue a bargaining order.8 9 Since an election is generally preferable to
the issuance of a bargaining order,' the Board must clearly articulate its
reasons for concluding that, under the circumstances, an election would
be inappropriate or invalid. In other words, the court must articulate the
reasons behind its decision that the case falls within one of the Gissel
categories which approves the issuance of a bargaining order in lieu of
holding an election. 91 The court concluded that "[e]ffective appellate
review, as well as judicial and administrative accountability, requires
that the Board clearly articulate the reasons behind any order,92 and
particularly why other remedies were found to be inappropriate."
In NLRB v. InternationalLongshoremen's & Warehousemen'sLocal
13, 93 the court enforced a Board supplementary order 94 againt a union

that had been operating a discriminatory hiring hall sponsorship program
in violation of subdivisions 8(b)(1)(A), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Act. 95
Part of the Board's original order required the union to "[m]ake whole
any and all applicants for employment for any loss of earnings they may
have suffered by reason' of [the union's] discriminatory exercise of its
. 96 When the union objected to this portion of
dispatch authority
86. 550 F.2d at 1151.
87. Id. at 1151-52.
88. 484 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1973).
89. The court quoted the following language from Peerless:
We have consistently held that Gissel contemplates that the Board must make "specific findings" as to the immediate and residual impact of the unfair labor practices on
the election process and that the Board must make "a detailed analysis" assessing the
possibility of holding a fair election in terms of any continuing effect of misconduct,
the likelihood of recurring misconduct, and the potential effectiveness of ordinary
remedies.
550 F.2d at 1151 (quoting Peerless of America, Inc. v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 1108, 1118 (7th Cir.
1973)).
90. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
91. Id. at 616. See note 85 supra.
92. 550 F.2d at 1152.
93. 549 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 397 (1977).
94. The Board's supplementary order is reported at 210 N.L.R.B. 952, 86 L.R.R.M.
1716 (1974).
95. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) and (b)(2)-(3) (1970).
96. 192 N.L.R.B. 260, 265 (1971).
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the Board's order, the court reviewed the propriety of the remedy and
availed itself of the opportunity to comment on the purpose of Board
orders.
The court pointed out that section 10(c) of the Act97 authorizes the
Board "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this

Act,''98 and that the Board has broad discretion in fashioning remedies
under that section. 99 It was noted that while it is true that the Board's
power to remedy violations of the Act does not include the power to
adopt punitive measures, 1° "make whole" orders, that is, orders requiring employers to compensate employees damaged by the unfair labor
practices, are not punitive in nature and are, thus, proper. 0 1 In answering
the union's argument that it could be destroyed by the Board's order
requiring it to reimburse several million dollars, the court observed that
the assertion was merely speculative. However,
even if the award did reach the total contemplated by the Union, that
does not change its nature from remedial to punitive. The Board is
simply requiring the Union to reimburse those who lost income as a
result of the Union's illegal discrimination. . . . [Tihe order merely
removes the effects of the unfair labor practice by giving those who
were its victims 10what
they would have received absent the Union
2
illegal practices.
Section 10(c) of the Act 10 3 expressly empowers the Board to prevent
and remedy unfair practices by ordering "reinstatement of employees
with . . .back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter
...
,,I4 In two cases decided in May, 1977, the Ninth Circuit examined the propriety of orders made pursuant to this section.
In NLRB v. Dodson's Market, Inc.,105 the Board petitioned for enforcement 1°6 of back pay awards1 07 made to three employees of Dodson's
97. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
98. 549 F.2d at 1355.
99. Id. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969); Fibreboard
Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964).
100. 549 F.2d at 1355 (quoting NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 359 (1969)). See Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
101. 549 F.2d at 1355. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941). In
empowering the Board to take any affirmative action that will effectuate congressional
policy with respect to national labor relations, Congress did not intend to differentiate
between discrimination in denying employment and in unlawfully terminating employment. Id. at 188-89.
102. 549 F.2d at 1355.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
104. Id.
105. 553 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1977).
106. The Board's decision is reported at 218 N.L.R.B. 1263, 89 L.R.R.M. 1543 (1975).
107. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
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Market, Inc. ("Dodson's"). 10 8 The first employee, Wortley, suffered a
reduction in hours when two senior employees were transferred into her
department in retaliation for their union activities. As a result, a surplus
of employees was created in that department, and Dodson's used this
excuse to reduce Wortley's hours. After voluntarily giving back pay to
the two transferred employees, Dodson's argued that if the two employees had actually worked the hours for which they had been compensated,
Wortley, as a junior employee, would not have worked the hours for
which the Board ordered reimbursement. The court, citing no authority,
summarily dismissed this argument, observing that it
ignores the fact that the reduction in hours for Wortley was a direct
result of Dodson's unfair labor practice. .

.

. If the senior employ-

ees had not been transferred to Wortley's department, her hours
would not have been reduced. It is thus irrelevant that Dodson's has
already paid back pay to the two senior employees.'°9
Dodson's also argued that a forty-hour work week was not the appropriate measure of back pay for Wortley since her hours would have been
reduced in any event, due to the seasonal nature of the company's
business. The court adhered to the well-established rule that "[t]he Board
has wide discretion in selecting an appropriate back pay formula, and
once it has done so, the burden is on the employer to produce evidence to
mitigate liability." 110 In view of the fact that Wortley had worked a fortyhour week for several months prior to Dodson's unlawful reduction of
her hours, the Board's computation of back pay was held to be reasonable and its order with respect to Wortley was enforced.
The court also approved the Board's order with respect to Gerber, the
second employee who received a back pay award. After deferring to the
Board's determinations regarding the credibility of the witnesses who
testified at the proceedings,"' the court ruled that the Board's order was
"supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole."112
108. In a prior proceeding, the Board had determined that Dodson's had violated the
Act by reducing the hours of some of its employees in retaliation for their signing union
representation cards. 194 N.L.R.B. 192, 78 L.R.R.M. 1628 (1971). The order stemming
from that proceeding was enforced by the court. 83 L.R.R.M. 2987,71 Lab. Cas. 13, 842
(9th Cir. 1973).
109. 553 F.2d at 618-19.
110. Id. at 619. See NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Local 13, 549 F.2d 1346
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 397 (1977); Golden Gate Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 467 F.2d
164 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 414 U.S. 168 (1972); NLRB v. Carpenters Local 180, 433 F.2d 934
(9th Cir. 1970).
111. The court stated: "We will not disturb findings on credibility unless 'a clear
preponderance of the evidence convinces [us] that they are incorrect.' " 553 F.2d at 619
(quoting NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Local 27, 514 F.2d 481, 483 (9th Cir.
1975)).
112. 553 F.2d at 619. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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As for Assink, the third recipient of a back pay award, the court
reached a different conclusion. Assink was hired by Dodson's for parttime employment in May, 1971, nine months after Dodson's illegal
activities occurred. It had been the Board's opinion that "but for"
Dodson's unfair labor practice, Assink's employment would have been
full-time. However, the court ruled that "[t]his carries the 'but for'
notion too far."" 3 The "but for" connection was declared to be necessary,- but insufficient by itself, to establish liability for an unfair labor
practice. "14 The court, once again, declared that "[t]he purpose of a back
pay order is 'to vindicate the public policy of the [National Labor
Relations Act] by making the employees whole for losses suffered on
account of an unfair labor practice.' "115 Since Assink suffered no loss
by virtue of Dodson's unfair labor practice, there was no reason for the
Board to have issued a "make whole" order. The order, then, did not
effectuate the policies of the Act" 6 and, for that reason, was denied
enforcement.
United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices Local 525 v.
NLRB"17 also involved the issuance of a back pay order. In this case,
however, the order was levied against a union. The union petitioned for
review of the Board's finding" 8 that it had violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of
the Act"19 by restraining and coercing the complaining member (Petrin)
20
"in the exercise of his statutory right to refrain from union activity."
Specifically, the union had threatened Petrin with loss of employment
and had coerced him into taking a leave of absence because of purported
irregularities in his union status and membership book. 121 Additionally,
the union had informed Petrin that it was prepared to walk off the job if
he didn't resolve the problem with his membership book, and Petrin
communicated these threats to his employer. The union itself did not
explicitly threaten the employer with a strike; however, through exten113. 553 F.2d at 619.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 620 (quoting Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25, 27 (1952)).
116. See Marriott Corp. v. NLRB, 491 F.2d 367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881
(1974) (back pay should be used only to effectuate policies of subchapter II of the Act).
117. 553 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1977).
118. The Board's findings and order are reported at 218 N.L.R.B. 451, 89 L.R.R.M.
1736 (1975).
119. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
120. 553 F.2d at 1204. Under 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), employees are granted the right to
refrain from participating in union and related activities, except to the extent that they are
required to become members of a union as a condition of employment. Such a requirement is authorized under id. § 158(a)(3).
121. Although Petrin was qualified as a building and construction trade journeyman, his
membership book incorrectly designated him as a metal trades journeyman.
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sive contact with the employer, the union made it clear that the matter
was a serious one.
Conceding that the factual determinations of the administrative law

judge,

22

if upheld by the Board, would constitute a violation of the Act,

the union nevertheless contended that the Board had no authority to

award back pay to Petrin. In responding to this contention, the court first
observed that in determining whether to issue a back pay order against a
union, the Board has emphasized that under section 10(c) of the Act 123 its
authority is limited to those cases in which the union has been responsible
for unlawful discrimination against the employee. 124 Thus, the Board has
distinguished between cases in which the employee is denied access to a
place of employment, e.g., by striking employees, and cases in which
the union has interfered with the employer-employee relationship. It has
stated that awards of back pay will not be made in the former case, even
though the strike was ultimately declared unlawful. 125 The purpose of this
26
policy is to prevent an indirect inhibition of the union's right to strike. 1
The policy has been implemented through the Colonial Hardwood interpretation 27 of section 10(c) of the Act.
After reviewing the Board's finding of fact, the court declared that the
Board's conclusion that there was discrimination was amply supported,
that the case was one in which the union had interfered with the employer-employee relationship, 28 and that the back pay award was, therefore,
appropriate. The court concluded by observing that
122. See note 137 infra.
123. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970).
124. United Furniture Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 563, 565, 24 L.R.R.M. 1302, 1306 (1949)
[hereinafter Colonial Hardwood]; National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971, 988-91, 22
L.R.R.M. 1289, 1301-04 (1948). The language of the Act giving rise to this interpretation of
the scope of Board authority reads: "[W]here an order directs reinstatement of an
employee, back pay may be required of the employer or labor organization, as the case
may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him ....... 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)
(1970). See Colonial Hardwood, 84 N.L.R.B. at 565 n.6.
125. Colonial Hardwood, 84 N.L.R.B. 563, 565-66,24 L.R.R.M. 1302, 1306 (1949). The
Board reasoned that the language of 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) permitted the Board to compensate an employee for "losses in pay suffered by him because of severance of or interference with the tenure or terms of the employment relationship between him and his
employer .... ." 84 N.L.R.B. at 565-66, 24 L.R.R.M. at 1306. But it did not permit an
award of damages for interference with the employee's right of ingress to the plant. Id.
126. Union de Tronquistas Local 901, 202 N.L.R.B. 399, 399-400, 82 L.R.R.M. 1525,
1528 (1973).
127. 84 N.L.R.B. 563, 565, 24 L.R.R.M. 1302, 1306 (1949). See notes 124-25 supra. The
validity of the Colonial Hardwood interpretation has been questioned by at least one
court. See National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 945, 965 (6th Cir. 1972).
128. The fact that the union did not explicitly threaten the employer with a strike or
request that he not permit Petrin to work was not determinative: "We see no reason,
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the policy rationale behind Colonial Hardwood does not compel a
finding that back pay is an improper remedy. In this case, the union
activity was directed at a single employee, and there is no danger
that the award in this case would inhibit Local 525 in exercising
its
29
right to strike or to engage in other protected activities. 1

D. Deference to Arbitration
Collateral unfair labor practice issues frequently arise during the proc-

ess of resolving contract disputes through arbitration. 3 ° When the arbitration process has led to an effective and satisfactory resolution of such
issues, the Board may decline to hear the case and simply "defer" to the

arbitral award. 3 ' Illustrative of the procedures, problems and policy
considerations involved in this practice of deference are two recent Ninth

Circuit cases, HawaiianHaulingService, Ltd. v. NLRB
son v.

32 and

Stephen-

NLRB. 1 33

In HawaiianHauling Service, 134 the court was called upon to review
the Board's refusal to defer to an arbitral award. 1 35 The controversy
centered around actions which took place at a grievance meeting between

the company and a Mr. Richardson, one of the company's employees.
The meeting was called in an effort to resolve problems regarding

Richardson's absenteeism and his alleged refusal to follow the orders of
the company's general manager. During the course of the meeting, as
tempers began to flare, Richardson called the general manager a "liar."
The executive responded by firing Richardson on the spot.
During subsequent arbitration to determine the legality of Richard-

136
son's discharge, the union contended that under section 7 of the Act,

however, to absolve the union of responsibility where an employer acts unilaterally to
discriminate in response to union pressure, even though it received no specific union
request." 553 F.2d at 1206. See National Cash Register Co. v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 945, 966
(6th Cir. 1972).
129. 553 F.2d at 1206.
130. See generally Note, The NLRB and Deference to Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191
(1968).
131. See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 734-43 (1976).
132. 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
133. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
134. 545 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977).
135. The Board's decision is reported at 219 N.L.R.B. 765, 90 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1975).
136. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). This section enumerates the organizational and collective
bargaining rights guaranteed to employees:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
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an employee's conduct at a grievance meeting is "protected activity,"
i.e., conduct which an employer is powerless to control, restrict, or
otherwise discipline. In an unexplained award, the arbitrator ruled that

the discharge had been proper. Unfair labor practice proceedings were
then instituted, wherein the administrative law judge' 37 deferred to the
arbitral award. The Board itself, however, overturned that ruling. 138 The

company then petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking to
139
vacate the Board's order.
In discussing the propriety of the Board's decision not to defer, the
court observed that "NLRB deference to an arbitration award is now an
integral part of the administration of federal labor law, but Board deference is nonetheless discretionary."" 4 It was also observed, however,
that the Board has limited its own discretion in such matters by adopting
specific criteria which it uses to guide its decisions regarding deference to
arbitration.' 4 ' In light of these criteria, the court concluded that a Board
decision deferring to an arbitral award will be upheld "unless the Board
clearly departs from its own standards or its standards are themselves
invalid." 41 2
The court held that the Board's refusal to defer was proper under the
holding of Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. NLRB.143 In Crown, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that shouting and profanity are protected activities within the setting of a grievance meeting.144 The Ninth Circuit
rdquiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
Id.
137. A hearing before an administrative law judge is a prerequisite to a hearing by the
Board. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)-(b) (1970); 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970).
138. 219 N.L.R.B. 765, 90 L.R.R.M. 1011 (1975).
139. Under 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), "Any person aggrieved by a final order of the
Board . . . may obtain a review of such order in any United States court of appeals
140. 545 F.2d at 675.
141. See, e.g., Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M.
1211 (1974); Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 77 L.R.R.M. 1931 (1971); International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923,51 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1962); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
142. 545 F.2d at 676. See, e.g., Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
House Workers Local 274 v. NLRB, 493 F.2d 1249, 1249 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
828 (1974); NLRB v. Horn & Hardart Co., 439 F.2d 674, 679 (2d Cir. 1971). In one recent
case the Ninth Circuit found the Board's own criteria for deferral to be inadequate. See
Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
143. 430 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1970).
144. The Crown court stated:
It has been repeatedly observed that passions run high in labor disputes and that
epithets and accusations are commonplace. Grievance meetings arising out of disputes between employer and employee are not calculated to create an aura of total
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further held that deferral to arbitration under the circumstances would

have violated the deferral criteria established in SpielbergManufacturing
Co. 145 Those criteria provide that "deferral will be rejected if the arbitral
award is repugnant to the purposes and policies of the National Labor
Relations Act . . . . " The court observed that
[t]he majority of the Board thought that the effect of the award
"substantially dilute[d] an employee's right to fully present his case
during grievance and arbitration proceedings" . . . by upholding a

discharge of an employee who used the epithet "liar" during the
grievance proceeding. The Board did not abuse its wide discretion in

thus characterizing the effect of the arbitral decision and in refusing
to defer to the award. 147

Four months after its decision in HawaiianHauling Service, the court
again dealt with the Board's deferral policy in Stephenson v. NLRB.148
The Stephenson decision should have a significant impact on labor
relations in the Ninth Circuit. 14 9 The court ruled that the Electronic
Reproduction Service Corp.150 expansion of the Spielberg deferral
peace and tranquility where compliments are lavishly exchanged. . . .[W]e do not
feel that the interests of collective bargaining will be served by the external imposition
of a rigid standard of proper and civilized behavior.
Id. at 731, quoted in Hawaiian Hauling Serv., 545 F.2d at 676 n.8.
145. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955). See note 151 infra.
146. 545 F.2d at 676.
147. Id. (footnote omitted).
148. 550 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1977).
149. For an extensive discussion of the Stephenson decision and its significance, see
Casenote, Stephenson v. NLRB, 11 LOY. L.A.L. REv. 199 (1977).
150. 213 N.L.R.B. 758, 87 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1974). Prior to ElectronicReproduction, the
Board had established a policy of not deferring to arbitral awards, notwithstanding
satisfaction of the Spielberg requirements, unless the unfair labor practice involved had
been both presented to and acted upon by the arbitrator. Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197
N.L.R.B. 928, 80 L.R.R.M. 1498 (1972); Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676, 79
L.R.R.M. 1467 (1972). These latter two cases were overruled in ElectronicReproduction.
In that case, the Board expressed concern over the fact that, in the wake of Yourga and
Airco, parties to arbitration proceedings had been withholding evidence of an unfair labor
practice in order to obtain a second hearing before the Board. Consequently, the Board
declared that in the absence of "unusual circumstances," it would defer to the arbitration
award even when no indication existed as to whether the arbitrator had considered, or had
been presented with, the unfair labor practice issue.
The "unusual circumstances" exception to the Electronic Reproduction rule would
involve, for example, cases in which the arbitration clause is not broad enough to include
the unfair labor practice issue, and cases in which the arbitrator deliberately excludes
statutory issues from the proceedings. 213 N.L.R.B. at 761-62, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1216. The
Electronic Reproduction extension of Spielberg has received unfavorable comment. See
Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interestsof Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 897, 909 nn.31&32 (1975);
Simon-Rose, Deferral Under Collyer by the NLRB of Section 8(a)(3) Cases, 27 LAB. L.J.
201, 209-12 (1976).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 11

criteria' 51 was invalid because it frequently enabled the Board to defer
"to an arbitration decision when [the Board] is ignorant of the issues
presented to and considered by that panel and of the basis for the latter's
decision."' 5 2 The court expressly approved the addition of the two4
15
Banyard53 prerequisites to the existing three-pronged Spielberg test.
Since, under the circumstances presented in Stephenson, 55 one of the
two Banyard prerequisites had not been satisfied (the requirement that
the arbitrator must have "clearly decided" the unfair labor practice issue
to which the Board is urged to give deference), 56 the court held that the
Board's decision to defer was erroneous. In so holding, the court rejected
the ElectronicReproduction rule 57 as "contrary to Section 10 of the Act
158
wherein the Board is empowered to prevent unfair labor practices."
Specifically, the court relied on language in section 10 which declares
151. A three-pronged test for determining when deferral to arbitration is proper was
announced by the Board in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082, 36 L.R.R.M.
1152, 1153 (1955):
[Tihe [arbitration] proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had
agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant
to the purposes and policies of the Act. In these circumstances we believe that the
desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settlement of labor disputes will be
best served by our recognition of the arbitrators' award.
While an informal policy of deferring to arbitration awards had existed prior to
Spielberg, see, e.g., Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 29 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1959);
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946), rev'd, 161 F.2d
949 (6th Cir. 1947), the Spielberg opinion was largely responsible for establishing the
deferral policy as a fixed doctrine.
152. 550 F.2d at 541.
153. Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Banyard, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals suggested that, in addition to the Spielberg criteria, the
following two prerequisites should be satisfied before deferral could be held proper: (1)
the arbitral tribunal must have clearly decided the unfair labor practice issue to which the
Board is later urged to give deference; and (2) the arbitral tribunal must have decided only
issues within its competence.
154. See note 151 supra.
155. The record before the court did not indicate "whether the issue of discriminatory
discharge under sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act was presented to or considered by the
arbitration panel." 550 F.2d at 539.
156. See notes 153 & 155 supra. In Stephenson, the court stated:
The "clearly decided" requirement means that the arbitrator's decision must specifically deal with the statutory issue. Merely because the arbitrator is presented with a
problem which involves both contractual and unfair labor practice elements does not
necessarily mean that he will adequately consider the statutory issue. . . . [W]here,
as here, there is no proof that the unfair labor practice issue or evidence was ever
presented to the arbitrator and/or the arbitrator's decision is ambiguous as to the
resolution of the statutory issue, then the "clearly decided" requirement has not been
met.
550 F.2d at 538 n.4.
157. See note 150 supra.
158. 550 F.2d at 539 (footnote omitted). Section 10 of the Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. §
160 (1970).
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that the Board's power to prevent unfair labor practices shall "not be
affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or
may be established by agreement, law or otherwise ... ."159 Inasmuch
as the Board bears this statutory responsibility for remedying unfair labor
practices, the policy of permitting the Board to defer in the absence of
evidence that the statutory issue had been "clearly decided" was characterized as "illogical. " 60 The flaw in such a practice is that it frequently
permits frustration of congressional intent and judicial policy:
Because arbitrators are not sub-branch of the Board and arbitration
is a contractual mechanism, arbitrators are obligated to effectuate
the will of the parties to the contract. Thus, they are not bound to
of contractual standards,
apply the Board's or the courts' definition
61
Act.
the
under
rights
enforce
or to
Consequently, Banyard is adopted and ElectronicReproduction "is
deference upon mere presumprejected as it permits the Board to base its
162
evidence."
any
of
absence
tion in total
II.
A.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Duty to Bargain in Good Faith

Section 8(d) of the Act 163 imposes a "mutual obligation" on the
employer and employee to demonstrate good faith in meeting and deciding the terms and conditions of employment." 6 In general, it is not
enough that a meeting takes place between an employer and the representative of his employees. Good faith bargaining also requires a serious
intent to adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common
ground. 165 The requirement of good faith bargaining, therefore, is that
both labor and management manifest a desire to reach agreement and
enter into a collective bargaining contract. 166 "Good faith bargaining"
was the subject of significant litigation in the Ninth Circuit during the
survey period.
In Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB 167 two unions, the Culinary Workers and the Marine Cooks, were competing for the right to
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

550 F.2d at 539 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1970)).
550 F.2d at 540.
Id.
Id.at 541.
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970).
Id.Section 8(d) of the Act states that the duty to bargain in good faith includes

"the performance of the mutual obligation.

.

.

to.

.

.confer in good faith with respect

to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. Id.
165. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485 (1960).
166. Id.
167. 560 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1977).
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represent the employees of a restaurant. Initially, the company entered
into an agreement with the Culinary Workers, but this agreement was
later set aside. Three representation elections followed and the Marine
Cooks were certified after the final election. The Board had found that
the company had committed thirteen unfair labor practices during and
after the elections.168 The improprieties included statements that a Marine
Cooks victory would be futile because five years would pass before the
company would agree to a collective bargaining agreement. A witness
was offered money to leave town rather than testify against the company.
Additionally, during the course of collective bargaining the Marine
Cooks and the company held fourteen negotiating sessions, but in spite of
the union's willingness to compromise, the company refused to agree to
any form of union security or to any hiring hall proposal.
In order to determine whether conduct by a party during negotiations
constitutes a refusal to bargain in good faith, the court must deal with two
competing tensions: that parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations unrestricted by any governmental power to regulate the substantive
solution of their differences; 69 and that parties are also obligated to deal
with each other seriously in an attempt to resolve differences and reach a
common ground. 170 Thus, while it is not the Board's job to judge the
concessions, proposals, and counterproposals either party may or may
not make, 17 1 the Board is afforded flexibility in determining "whether a
party's conduct at the bargaining table evidences a real desire to come
into agreement." 172 The test of an employer's good faith in bargaining is
whether it is to be inferred from the totality of the employer's
conduct that he went through the motions of negotiation as an
168. These findings were included in the administrative law judge's intermediate report
and were adopted by the Board on July 5, 1973. Id. at 406 & n.l. Since the parties filed no
exceptions to the intermediate report, Queen Mary Restaurants Corp., 219 N.L.R.B. 776,
776 n.1, 90 L.R.R.M. 1017, 1018 n.1 (1975), the Board's adoption thereof was a matter of
course. See R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 8 (1976).

169. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295-96 (1959).
170. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960). The policy of

Congress is to impose a mutual duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire
to reach agreement, in the belief that such an approach from both sides promotes the overall design of achieving industrial peace. Id. at 488.
171. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395,404 (1952). In addition, the Board
may not regulate the choice of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective
bargaining, as this would place it in the position of being able to exercise considerable
influence upon the substantive terms of the parties' contract. NLRB v. Insurance
Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960). In fact, the Supreme Court has admitted
that the reservation of economic weapons, and their actual exercise on occasion by the
parties, is part and parcel of the system of labor relations. Id. at 489.
172. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960).
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elaborate pretense with no desire to reach an agreement if possible,
was unable to arrive at an
or that it [sic] bargained in good faith but
73

acceptable agreement with the union. 1
In addition, findings pertaining to the parties' good faith in collective
bargaining is a matter for the Board's expertise, 174 and inferences drawn
from the facts by the Board will not be set aside merely because the
court's inference seems more plausible or reasonable.

75

Applying these principles to the facts in Queen Mary Restaurants
Corp., the court affirmed the Board's finding that the employer had
refused to bargain in good faith. It was held that based on the totality of
the circumstances, the company had engaged in surface bargaining with
the union. The court considered as "background" the unfair labor
practices campaign waged against the Marine Cooks during and after the
representation elections. 1 76 It also considered other independent unfair

labor practices, such as bargaining directly with the employees on the
issue of seniority, 177 raising the wages of the employees unilaterally

without notice to the Marine Cooks 178 and refusing to supply information
to the union relevant to the subjects of collective bargaining. 179 The court
also affirmed the Board's finding that the company's refusal to negotiate
on the issues of union security and hiring hall was an additional indication that the company had not bargained in good faith.

It is worthwhile to note that the company advanced several arguments
to justify its refusal to negotiate on the issues of union security and hiring
173. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 887 (1953). As the "Board is not to be blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface
motions of collective bargaining, it must take. . . cognizance of the reasonableness of the
positions" of the respective parties. Id. Therefore, "while the Board cannot force
an employer to make a 'concession' on any specific issue or to adopt any particular
position, the employer is obliged to make some reasonable effort in some direction to
compose his differences with the union .... ." Id. at 134-35.
174. NLRB v. Dent, 534 F.2d 844, 846 (9th Cir. 1976).
175. NLRB v. Millmen Local 550, 367 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1966).
176. Events which occur outside of the six-month statute of limitations provided in §
10(b) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970), may be considered as evidence of that conduct
taking place within the six-month period which is being challenged. NLRB v. Longshoremen's Local 13, 549 F.2d 1346, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Carpenter's Local 745,450
F.2d 1255, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 1971).
177. Bypassing an exclusive bargaining agent to negotiate directly with employees
violates the employer's duty to bargain collectively with the chosen representatives of his
employees. Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 683-84 (1944).
178. A unilateral change in condition of employment during negotiations violates §
8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970), since it is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate.
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
179. Emeryville Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 1971). The court
stated: "Refusing to supply such information will support a finding by the Board of failure
" Id.
to bargain in good faith under § 8(a)(5) of the Act ....
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hall, all of which were rejected by the court. The first was that the
company represented those employees who had voted against the Marine
Cooks and that any compromise would betray them. The court rejected
this argument as contradictory to a basic tenet of collective bargaining:
"a certified union is the exclusive bargaining representative of all of the
employees in the bargaining unit, including those who voted against the
union and those who are not union members."' 180 As a corollary to this
rule, the employer has a "duty to recognize the certified union as
representing all the employees." 181
The second argument presented by the company to justify its refusal to
consider any form of union security or hiring hall was that it opposed
both "as a matter of principle." However, the Board rejected this
contention and the court affirmed on the basis that the company's parent

operated five restaurants whose employees were unionized. Four of these
restaurants had contracts with the Culinary Workers (the rival union
which the Marine Cooks defeated), and each contract contained union
security and hiring hall provisions. The court concluded that rejection of
a contract provision as a "matter of principle" will support "an inferwhen the same provision is agreed to with
ence of bad-faith bargaining
82
another, favored union." 1

The company contended that the Board's finding that the company had
refused to bargain in good faith, in effect, "forced the company to make
concessions on substantive contract terms .

. . ."

The court did not

agree. While the Supreme Court has held that the Board may not compel
an employer to accept a specific contract term,183 the propriety of a Board
180. 560 F.2d at 409. See Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 46-47 (1954).
181. 560 F.2d at 409. Section 9(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970), read in
conjunction with id. § 8(a)(5) (1970), announces both an affirmative and a negative
mandate. It directs the employer to affirmatively "bargain" with the majority representative concerning all matters which can be classified as "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment." Equally important, it directs the
employer not to bargain on such matters with any person other than the majority representative. Thus, the Supreme Court held in Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
678, 684 (1944) that the employer could not bypass the bargaining agent and engage in
negotiations regarding wages and other working conditions with individual employees in
the plant, even though the employees initiated the negotiations and actually sought to deal
directly rather than through the duly elected majority union.
182. In United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846, 852 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 904 (1968), the court was unimpressed by the employer's claim that he rejected a
checkoff as a matter of principle. The court based its decision on the company's campaign
literature which identified its refusal to checkoff as undermining the union's position, the
lack of reliance on inconvenience or other business purpose, and the company's refusal to
consider alternatives.
183. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 102 (1970). Porterheld that a Board order
compelling the employer to agree to a proposed checkoff clause "would violate the
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finding that an employer has not bargained in good faith has never been
questioned. Finally, the court was unimpressed by the company's argument that an inference of bad faith is not supported merely because a
party insists on taking a certain bargaining position.' While conceding
that this proposition was generally valid, 185 the court noted that as a
precondition to applying this principle, there must be a lack of other
"substantial evidence that a negotiating party's attitude is inconsistent

'
with its duty to seek an agreement." 186
In this case there was other

substantial evidence of the company's bad faith. Therefore,

the

company's uncompromising attitude supported an additional inference of
bad faith and rendered the aforementioned general principle inapplicable.
NLRB v. Cheese Barn, Inc. 187 involved a company which insisted, to
the point of impasse, upon a non-mandatory subject of bargaining
throughout collective bargaining negotiations., 8 8 The company wanted a

provision whereby the bargaining unit employees would ratify the agreement before it could become effective.

18 9

The court, in declaring the company's insistence an unfair labor
practice, reviewed the landmark Supreme Court decision in NRLB v.
1 Borg-Warnerdeclared
Borg-Warner Corp. 99
that there were two mutu-

ally exclusive categories of bargaining subjects: mandatory subjects and
fundamental premise upon which the Act is based-private bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the actual
terms of the contract." Id. at 108.
184. See Wal-Lite v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. MacMillan
Ring-Free Oil Co., 394 F.2d 26, 29-30 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 914 (1968).
185. One court has noted that if the insistence is genuine and sincere, it may be
maintained forever. NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729 (1st Cir. 1964).
"Deep conviction, firmly held and from which no withdrawal will be made, may be more
than the traditional opening gambit of a labor controversy. It may be both the right of the
citizen and essential to our economic legal system. . . of free collective bargaining." Id.
at 73 1.
186. 560 F.2d at 411 (quoting Wal-Lite v. NLRB, 484 F.2d 108, 111 (8th Cir. 1973)).
187. 558 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1977).
188. The employer and employee are obligated to negotiate in good faith with respect to
mandatory subjects of bargaining-"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1970). The duty is limited to these subjects. As to other
non-mandatory matters, however, each party is free to bargain or not bargain, and to
agree or not agree. NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958).
189. Although this was a standard practice with the union, it was not required by the
union's constitution or embodied in any previous collective bargaining agreement to which
the union was a party. 558 F.2d at 527.
190. 356 U.S. 342 (1958). In Borg-Warner the employer refused to reach a settlement
with the union unless the agreement contained two clauses: first, a "ballot clause," which
required that in future negotiations the employer's last bargaining offer would be put to a
secret vote of the employees in the unit (union and non-union) before a strike could be
called; and second, a "recognition clause," recognizing as bargaining agent a local of the
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non-mandatory subjects. 1 91 The company or union may insist in good
faith on a provision which is mandatory, even to the point of impasse. 192
A party may also attempt to bargain for a provision governing a nonmandatory subject of bargaining, and if the provision is otherwise legal
and the other party agrees to it, the provision becomes an enforceable
part of the collective bargaining agreement. But if the other party refuses
to agree to a non-mandatory provision, the proponent may not insist on
its inclusion to the point of impasse. 193 Thus, in Borg-Warner the Court
held that it was unlawful for an employer to condition its agreement with
the union upon a provision which would require the union, in future
negotiations, to submit the employer's last offer to a vote of all employees in the unit and which would authorize a strike only in the event the
employees rejected the offer. This conclusion is justified since the particular clause in controversy dealt with the bargaining strategy of the
union and the employees. In addition, "it substantially modifies the
collective-bargaining system provided for in the statute by weakening the
independence of the 'representative' chosen by the employees. It enables
with its employees rather than with their
the employer, in effect, to9 deal
4
representative."
statutory
In Cheese Barn, the Ninth Circuit held that the ratification of a
collective bargaining agreement by bargaining unit employees was a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. The court, quoting from a Sixth Circuit
decision, 195 noted that by insisting that the contract be ratified by a
United Automobile Workers, rather than the International which had been certified by the
NLRB. After the union finally acquiesced to the employer's demands, it charged that 29
U.S.C. § 8(a)(5) (1970) had been violated. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the
union. The Court rejected the employer's claim that it was free to insist on the ballot and
recognition clauses as a condition to an agreement, and held that such insistence was
unlawful when the subject in question was not a "mandatory" subject of bargaining. The
two contested clauses fell outside the range of § 8(d), which limits mandatory bargaining
to "wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment":
The company's good faith has met the requirements of the statute as to the subjects of
mandatory bargaining. But that good faith does not license the employer to refuse to
enter into agreements on the ground that they do not include some proposal which is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining. We agree with the Board that such conduct is,
in substance, a refusal to bargain about the subjects that are within the scope of
mandatory bargaining. This does not mean that bargaining is to be confined to the
statutory subjects. Each of the two controversial clauses is lawful in itself. Each
would be enforceable if agreed to by the unions. But it does not follow that, because
the company may propose these clauses, it can lawfully insist upon them as a
condition to any agreement.
356 U.S. at 349.
191. 356 U.S. at 349.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.at 350.
195. Houchens Mkt., Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1967).
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majority of employees, the company "was attempting to bargain...
with respect to a matter which was exclusively within the internal domain
of the union." 96 Since the employees could delegate to the union the
authority to make a binding contract without their ratification, the
company could no more insist upon employee ratification than the union
could insist that the contract be submitted to the company's board of
directors. Since the union was empowered by its members to make
agreements on their behalf without securing their approval, the company
had no right to interfere with that relationship. The decision in Cheese
Barn is consistent with the decisions of the other circuits 97 on this issue.
In NLRB v. Abex Corp.198 the Board petitioned for enforcement of its

order finding the company guilty of an unfair labor practice. 199 The
controversy began when production and maintenance employees of the
company voted to be represented by the union. This bargaining unit and
the company thereafter reached an agreement covering these employees
and excluding all others. One month later, the union petitioned for a
representation election for certain salaried employees not covered under
the previous agreement. However, since the Board's regional director
found that the salaried employees shared a community of interest with the
union members and performed similar functions, it was ordered that the
salaried employees be perriitted to vote on whether they wanted to join
the existing bargaining unit. 2" The company informed the salaried employees prior to the election that they would be covered by the existing
collective bargaining agreement if they were added to the existing bargaining unit. After a majority of the workers voted to join the bargaining
unit, the company started paying hourly wages and fringe benefits as
designated in the existing contract.
With two members dissenting, the Board held that the company's
notification to the employees before the elections and its acts thereafter
196. 558 F.2d at 530 (quoting Houchens Mkt., Inc. v. NLRB, 375 F.2d 208, 212 (6th Cir.
1967)).
197. See, e.g., NLRB v. C & W Lektra Bat Co., 513 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1975); American
Seating Co. v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Darlington Veneer Co., 236
F.2d 85 (4th Cir. 1956).
198. 543 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1976).
199. The Board's order is reported at 215 N.L.R.B. 665, 88 L.R.R.M. 1157 (1974).
200. This type of election is called a "Globe election," taking its name from the
Board's decision in Globe Mach. & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, 1-A L.R.R.M. 122
(1937). The election permits employees sharing the same community of interest as an
already represented unit of employees to vote on whether to join the existing bargaining
unit. See NLRB v. Underwood Mach. Co., 179 F.2d 118, 120-21 (Ist Cir. 1949). The
device is also used where two unions are vying for the same group of employees, but one
union seeks to represent them in a small unit while the competing union seeks to include
them with other employees in a more comprehensive unit. Federal-Mogul Corp., 209
N.L.R.B. 343, 345, 85 L.R.R.M. 1353, 1355 (1974).
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were unfair labor practices in violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and (a)(5)
of the Act.2 " The Ninth Circuit, in denying enforcement of the Board's
petition, held that when a group of employees performing functions
nearly identical to those performed by an existing bargaining unit is
absorbed into the existing bargaining unit, the employer is free to apply
the terms of an existing agreement to the formerly unrepresented employees. The court declined to follow the Board's decision in Federal-Mogul
Corp. ,202 pointing out that not only was there a,"community of interest"
between the originally excluded members and those represented by the
existing unit in the present dispute, but that the work performed by the
excluded salaried employees was "functionally similar to that performed
by certain employees within the existing bargaining unit.' '203 In addition,
the court adopted the reasoning of the dissent in Federal-Mogulwhich
emphasized that applying the existing contract terms to the formerly
unrepresented group prevented a bifurcation of the bargaining unit for the
duration of the existing contract; and that any inequities found to exist
could be remedied when the next contract was negotiated. °4
While the result reached by the court is correct, it should be carefully
limited to situations where, as here, the formerly excluded employees
perform work functionally similar to that performed by the existing unit
employees. Otherwise, individuals not parties to an agreement could
"vote themselves a share of the bargain which the other parties had
agreed to between and for themselves. "205 This in turn would require that
both parties to a negotiation bargain for "groups of people whose identity
and number would be totally unknown. . . by either party. "26 However, where the formerly excluded employees are found to perform work
functionally similar to existing unit employees, and where application for
membership would involve only some readjustment of pay and benefits,
201. Subsection (a) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "(I) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157
[permitting workers to join unions and bargain collectively] . .. ; (5) to refuse to bargain
"29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5)
collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
(1970).
202. 209 N.L.R.B. 343, 85 L.R.R.M. 1353 (1974).
203. 543 F.2d at 721.
204. 209 N.L.R.B. at 347, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1357 (Members Kennedy and Panello,
dissenting).
205. Id. at 344, 85 L.R.R.M. at 1354.
206. Id. Under this scheme, costs of wages and benefits under negotiation would
become unpredictable, negotiations of benefits such as health and pension plans would be
impossible to calculate, and bargaining in general would be severely handicapped. Id.
However, where the terms of the existing agreement are applied to a group who performs
work functionally similar to the existing unit, and whose package of wages and benefits
remains substantially unchanged before and after union representation, there is no unfairness.
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it is in the interest of industrial peace and fairness to apply the existing
contract during the interim period before its expiration.
B.

Duty of FairRepresentation

The principle that a bargaining representative must represent all employees was first announced by the Supreme Court in Steele v. Louisville

& Nashville Railroad.2°7 In declaring that the labor union must represent
the interests of all workers in the bargaining unit, including blacks, the
Court stated that
the fair interpretation of the statutory language is that the organization chosen to represent a craft is to represent all its members, the

majority as well as the minority, and it is to act for and not against
those whom it represents. It is a principle of general application that
the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the
assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their
interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be
deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is
20 8
exercised unless so expressed.

The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of the union's duty of fair
representation in the context of collective bargaining in NLRB v. Gener-

al Truck DriversLocal 315. 209 In that case, the union and the company
had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with a "bumping

rights"

210

provision, but the union had not yet decided whether to

exercise the provision. When the company announced its intention to

terminate certain services, the union decided to conduct an election
among its members to determine whether those employees who would
lose their jobs should be reassigned with full seniority to another job
classification. The employees voted twenty to eight against bumping
rights, and one employee, Ted Holman, was terminated. Charges that the
207. 323 U.S. 192 (1944). See note 214 infra for a more complete discussion of Steele.
208. 323 U.S. at 202. The union has been held to have violated its duty of fair
representation when it implements a policy of racial discrimination while negotiating a
new contract, Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); when it refuses to
process grievances, Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1966); when it takes away work from employees outside the bargaining unit in order to
preserve it for the unit members, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768
(1952); when it refuses to refer women applicants for jobs, Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 209
N.L.R.B. 519, 85 L.R.R.M. 1389 (1974); and when it refuses to allow a woman to "bump"
into a position occupied by a less senior man, Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312
(8th Cir. 1972).
209. 545 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1976).
210. "Bumping rights" allow a senior employee whose job or equipment is eliminated
to be reassigned "to another classification with full seniority rights subject to employee
qualifications." Id. at 1174.
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union breached its duty of fair representation were then filed. The Board,
with one member dissenting, held that "the Union had failed to represent
Holman in a fair and impartial manner in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act." 2 11
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis of the legality of Holman's

termination with a restatement of the Vaca v. Sipes doctrine.21 2 Vaca
held that the exclusive bargaining agent has a statutory obligation to
serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination.
This obligation includes the duty to exercise discretion with complete
good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct. 2 13 Although the

duty of fair representation in Vaca required the union to process grievances against the employer, in Local 315 the duty was one which
involved collective bargaining.214 Since the rationale behind the duty of
fair representation is to compensate employees for their lost opportunity
to bargain for themselves, Local 315 required that the union give fair
consideration to minority interests and adhere to a rational decisionmaking process.215
211. Id. at 1175. Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), makes it
an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 7; namely, the right to join, form, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively, and engage in other concerted activities. See 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
212. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
213. Id. at 177.
214. Originally, the requirement that the bargaining representative must fairly represent
all employees arose in the context of racial discrimination. In Steele v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), a railroad company and the union representing its firemen
negotiated several contract provisions which set a ceiling on the number of black
employees to be assigned work within the bargaining unit, and restricted altogether the
access of black workers to certain positions. An action was brought against both the
railroad and the union on behalf of a number of black firemen who had lost their jobs
because of the defendants' racially discriminatory agreement.
The Court stated that implicit in the Railway Labor Act was a duty to refrain from
"hostile discrimination" against any minority group within the bargaining unit, and
concluded that "discriminations based on race alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious" and therefore in violation of that Act. Id. at 202-03. Later, the duty of fair
representation was extended to unions functioning as bargaining agents under the National Labor Relations Act, rather than the Railway Labor Act. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953). This duty was again extended to apply not only to the
negotiations for a new agreement, but also to the administration and processing of
grievances under an existing agreement. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335
(1964) (union representing two groups of employees in different locations was held to have
duty to act in good faith in adjusting rights of these groups in event of merger).
215. One court, in discussing the obligation of the union to make reasoned decisions,
indicated that a union's conduct even "[w]ithout any hostile motive of discrimination"
could be so "unreasonable and arbitrary as to constitute a violation of the duty of fair
representation." Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir. 1972). In the context of a
union handling a grievance, the court observed that while the union may refuse to process
a grievance for any number of reasons, it could not do so "without reason, merely at the
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The Local 315 court affirmed the Board's finding that the union had
failed to represent Holman's interests fairly. This conclusion was based
on the fact that the union's decision against applying bumping rights was
a result of a vote of the employees after an occasion for bumping had
arisen; the ballot used for the election was tainted by a bias against the
workers whose jobs were to be eliminated. Further, the union's decision
had not been based on the views of its members as to whether the
bumping principle should be approved prospectively, but on the views of
its members as to whether Holman, and others faced with a layoff,
should on this occasion be permitted to exercise a right to bump.216 The

court concluded that while it would not necessarily be improper for a
union to use an election process under other circumstances, the facts in
this situation indicated that the conduct of the union toward Holman was
so arbitrary that the union had breached its duty to represent his interests
fairly. Thus, even the use of democratic processes within the union could
not shelter it against a finding of violation of the duty of fair representation. This is still particularly true where, as in Local 315, the members'
decisions are made at a time when their votes for or against a change will
not be based on the merits of the issue in the abstract, but rather on the
preordained dictates of self-interest. 7
III. RECOGNITION OF BARGAINING REPRESENTATIVES
Section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA218 declares it to be an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with represen-

tatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of Section 9(a)."

21 9

whim of someone exercising union authority. A union must especially avoid capricious
and arbitrary behavior in the handling of a grievance based on a discharge-the industrial
equivalent of capital punishment." Id. See Clark, The Duty of FairRepresentation, 51
TEX. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (1973).
216. The Board had stated:
What is striking, however, is that the vote was taken after the layoff was announced,
and whether or not the voters knew all the details of the layoff each presumably knew
whether his own job was scheduled for elimination. Those not scheduled for layoff
would naturally think twice before voting for bumping rights just then. And most
importantly, the voting on this issue was limited to those, and only those, who would
be adversely affected by a vote to permit the bumping.
NLRB v. General Truck Drivers Local 315, 545 F.2d at 1176 n.1.
217. Cf. Truck Drivers Local 568 v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 137 (D.C. Cir. 1967). In that ca'se
the employer, whose workers were represented by one union, acquired a smaller company
represented by the Teamsters. The two groups of employees were merged. In the context
of a representation election, the established union made assurances that, if elected, it
would discriminate against the Teamster employees in the determination of a.seniority list.
The court affirmed the Board's conclusion that this campaign promise was a violation of §
8(b)(l)(A) since it might have coerced members of both unions into voting for their current
representation, solely on the basis of their fears concerning seniority placement.
218. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
219. Id.
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Section 9(a) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective
bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the
employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment .... 220
Alaska Roughnecks & DrillersAssociation v. NLRB 221 presented a
situation in which Mobil Oil Co. was charged with a refusal to bargain.
The duty to bargain was allegedly imposed by Mobil's status as either a
successor or joint employer. Mobil had operated an offshore drilling
platform in Alaska and had subcontracted with Santa Fe Drilling Co. to
-perform drilling operations. Santa Fe worked on a cost-plus basis, with
Mobil supervising Santa Fe's employees by directing the drilling operations. When Alaska Roughnecks & Drillers Association (the union) later
organized the workers of all Santa Fe operations in Alaska, a representation petition was filed naming Santa Fe as the employer. The union
stipulated that Santa Fe was the employer and Mobil took no part in the
representation hearings. Later, after the union had been certified as the
bargaining agent, Santa Fe and the union began negotiating. The negotiations were unsuccessful, however, and the employees instituted a strike.
Meanwhile, as permitted in the contract, Mobil notified Santa Fe of its
intention to terminate the contract. Upon learning of the impending
termination, the union asked Mobil to bargain as a "successor employer. "222 Mobil refused to bargain. An administrative law judge, with the
Board affirming, found that Mobil was guilty
of an unfair labor practice
223
for refusing to bargain as a joint employer.
In refusing to enforce the Board's order, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that Mobil had no duty to bargain since it had not had an opportunity to
participate in the certification proceedings and had not been requested by
the union to bargain until after Mobil had terminated its contract with
Santa Fe. The court recognized that the application of due process in the
context of administrative proceedings was not novel224 and that the
220. Id. § 159(a).
221. 555 F.2d 732 (9th Cir. 1977).
222. See Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 611 (9th Cir. 1977).
See also notes 233-49 infra and accompanying text.
223. 555 F.2d at 734. The principal factors weighed by the Board in deciding whether
sufficient integration exists to treat a specific separate concern as a single employer are:
(1) interrelation of operations; (2) centralized control of labor relations; (3) common
management; and (4) common ownership. Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians
Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv., 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965).
224. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970); NLRB v. Welcome-Am.
Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1971).
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procedural requirements of due process were twofold. The first require-

ment is notice and opportunity to be heard. 22 Implicit in this is the
requirement that the hearing must be "granted at a meaningful time and

in a meaningful manner. '"226 Here, however, the first notice Mobil
received that the union considered it to be an employer of Santa Fe's
employees was after the contract termination, when it was asked to

bargain. Even then, Mobil was not asked to bargain as a joint employer.
Instead, the union asked that it bargain as a successor employer. While it

was possible that Mobil could have anticipated its duty to bargain, the
court pointed out that no breach of that duty could be imposed upon an
employer when the employees had not indicated their willingness to
bargain.227
The second aspect of due process which the court discussed related to

NLRB regulations for certification proceedings. 228 The court noted that
while Mobil may have been aware of the union's activities before the
union requested bargaining, Mobil was equally aware that it had not been
asked to participate in the certification proceedings. Since Mobil was
neither named as an employer nor given the opportunity to object, 229 it
was entitled0 to rely on the certification result that Santa Fe was the sole
2
employer.
225. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-70 (1970). In Kelly, it was held that procedural due process under the fourteenth amendment required that welfare recipients be
afforded an evidentiary hearing before termination of benefits by welfare authorities. As
the Supreme Court had earlier stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306
(1950), "An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding
. . .is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections." Id. at 314.
226. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
227. 555 F.2d at 735-36. See NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S.
292, 297 (1939). Note, however, that an employer may not create artificial devices to avoid
knowledge that a union has demanded to bargain with it. NLRB v. Regal Aluminum, Inc.,
436 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1971). That court stated that "the company cannot hide behind its
own self-constructed wall of obstinance and thereby use its ignorance as a shield." Id. at
527. In an analogous case, the Ninth Circuit stated that "[tihe manner in which an
employer receives reliable information of union representation, whether by accident or by
design, or even while the employer is seeking to avoid receiving it, is of no consequence
.. " Snow v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1962).
228. 29 C.F.R. §§ 102.60-.72 (1976).
229. Id. § 102.63(b) requires that the employer receive notice of a hearing to determine
a petition for representation.
230. The Alaska Roughnecks court noted that rules promulgated by administrative
bodies should be followed since "[f]ailure to follow such guidelines tends to cause unjust
discrimination and deny adequate notice contrary to fundamental concepts of fair play
and due process." 555 F.2d at 735 (quoting NLRB v. Welcome-Am. Fertilizer Co., 443
F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir. 1971)).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I11

Finally, the Alaska Roughnecks court concluded that even if Mobil
had been a joint employer with Santa Fe, the fact that Santa Fe received
notice of the certification proceedings was not the equivalent of Mobil's
receiving adequate notice. The court conceded that under certain circumstances, joint employers could receive notice of their status as such by
means other than the statutory notice required in representation proceedings. 231 The employer, however, must have received actual notice in
order to be charged with a duty to bargain. The court also conceded that
had Mobil actively intervened in Santa Fe's labor dispute with the
union, 232 the court could have sustained a finding of joint employership.
Since Mobil had neither received actual notice, nor intervened in the
labor dispute, the court was unwilling to affirm a finding that Mobil was
a joint employer. As a result, the court was unable to affirm the Board's
finding of a refusal to bargain by Mobil.
Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB 233 presented an important
and heretofore unresolved issue of labor law regarding the successor
employer. In NLRB v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, Inc. ,34
the Supreme Court had held that when a company hires employees who
had worked for a predecessor company, and when those employees
continue to perform the same work in the same setting, the successor
company is obligated to recognize and bargain with the predecessor's
union for the period during which the predecessor would have been
obligated to do so.2 35 This duty to bargain, however, does not arise until
the former employees of the predecessor constitute a majority of the work
231. 555 F.2d at 736-37. See also Ace-Alkire Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 431 F.2d
280, 282 (8th Cir. 1970).
232. 555 F.2d at 737. See also NLRB v. Long Lake Lumber Co., 138 F.2d 363,364 (9th
Cir. 1943).
233. 553 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1977).
234. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
235. Id. at 281. This is based on the notion that "a mere change of employers or of
ownership in the employing industry is not such an 'unusual circumstance' as to affect the
force of the Board's certification within the normal operative period if a majority of the
employees after the change of ownership or management were employed by the preceding
employer." Id. at 279. See NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921,925 (6th Cir.
1964); NLRB v. McFarland, 306 F.2d 219, 221 (10th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Auto Ventshade,
Inc., 276 F.2d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 1960). This is consistent with the working rules developed
by the Board regarding the continued majority status of a union when the employer
remains the same. Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98-99 (1954). Cf. NLRB v. Burns Int'l
Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3 (1972) ("A Board certification carries with it
an almost conclusive presumption that the majority representative status of the union
continues for a reasonable time, usually a year."). After the one-year period there is a
rebuttable presumption of majority representation. Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 672,
28 L.R.R.M. 1362, 1366 (1951). See also NLRB v. Vegas Vic, Inc., 546 F.2d 828, 829 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 57 (1977) and text accompanying notes 250-62 infra.
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force of the successor employer.2 36 In situations where the new employer
does not retain all of the former employees of its predecessor, its duty to

bargain will not be evident until it has hired its "full complement" of
employees .237
In Pacific Hide, the Ninth Circuit addressed the problem of what is

meant by a "full complement" of workers. Cahen Trading Company had
operated a hide-curing facility with a staff which fluctuated between
twelve and eighteen workers. Cahen had recognized a particular union as
the collective bargaining representative of its employees for twenty

years. The contract in effect in March, 1975, when Pacific Hide bought
the business (without assuming its liabilities), contained no provision
3 8 On April 10, Cahen termaking it binding on Cahen's successors13
minated all of its employees. Later that day, Pacific interviewed the
Cahen workers and hired seven of them. Within eight days, four additional employees were hired, none of whom were former Cahen workers.
On April 17, the union demanded recognition of and compliance with the
former collective bargaining agreement, but Pacific refused on April 29.
After April 29, Pacific hired eight more employees, none of whom were
former Cahen workers. By June 6, Pacific had a total of nineteen
employees in the unit, seven of whom were former Cahen employees and
twelve of whom were not. There was no evidence that Pacific's hiring
236. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 294-95 (1972). Thus,
where "there is a change of employers,. . . and an almost complete turnover of employees, the certification may not bar a challenge if the successor employer is not bound by the
collective bargaining contract, particularly if the new employees are represented by
another union ....
" Id.at 279 n.3.
237. Id. at 294-95. Even where the predecessor's employees represent a majority of the
successor's work force, the successor employer's only duty is to bargain with the workers; it is not bound by the substantive provisions of the former employer's collective
bargaining contract. Id. at 284. This interpretation is based on the strong policy implicit in
the NLRA favoring voluntary establishment of contract terms by bargaining between the
j arties, free of governmental dictation of those terms. Id. at 287. The Supreme Court in
Burns had emphasized the need for employers to rearrange physical and human resources
in an effort to resuscitate ailing businesses:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can
make changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location,
task assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms
and conditions of employment contained in the old collective-bargaining contract may
make these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital.
On the other hand, a union may have made concessions to a small or failing employer
that it would be unwilling to make to a large or economically successful firm.
Id. at 287-88.
238. While it is true that "in a variety of circumstances involving a merger, stock
acquisition, reorganization, or assets purchase, [it might be found] as a matter of fact that
the successor had assumed the obligations under the old contract," this is not true where
"the successor employer is merely doing the same work in the same place with the same
employees as his predecessor .... ." Id. at 291.
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policy was motivated by anti-union sentiment. The parties stipulated that
Pacific had reached its full complement of nineteen employees as of June
6.
The court began its analysis with the observation that although Pacific
continued in the same business as Cahen, utilizing the same facilities,

equipment, and methods of production,239 it was not necessarily bound to
bargain with the employees. An employer, like Pacific, who purchases
the assets of a business is not bound to hire the employees of the
predecessor in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. 2" In order for
the duty to bargain to arise, a majority of the work force must consist of
former employees in that unit,241 there being a presumption that the
majority status of the union continues. 42 However, the successor employer has the right not to hire any of the former employees, and unless a
majority of his work force consists of employees of the predecessor,
there is no duty to bargain. 43 The problem here was that if the controlling
date for determining the majority status was April 11, when Pacific
began to operate in the former Cahen plant, then Pacific was obligated to
bargain, since on that date all seven employees had worked for Cahen.
The majority also existed on April 17, when the union demanded recognition. If, however, the controlling date was June 6, the date on which it
was stipulated that Pacific reached its "full complement," then Pacific
239. These factors are among those normally weighed by the Board in making a
determination as to whether a new employer shall be considered a successor. See, e.g.,
J-P Mfg., Inc., 194 N.L.R.B. 965, 968, 79 L.R.R.M. 1216, 1218 (1972).
240. See note 238 supra. See also Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel &
Restaurant Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 261-62 (1974); Golden
State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 184 n.6 (1973); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security
Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 280-81 n.5 (1972).
241. See notes 235-37 supra.
242. 553 F.2d at 611. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281
(1972); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Daneker Clock
Co., 516 F.2d 315, 316 (4th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Zayre Corp., 424 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (5th
Cir. 1970).
243. 553 F.2d at 611. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local, Hotel & Restaurant
Employees & Bartenders Int'l Union, 417 U.S. 249, 261-63 (1974); NLRB v. United Indus.
Workers, 422 F.2d 59, 62-63 (5th Cir. 1970); NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc.,
338 F.2d 833, 836 (9th Cir. 1964). It is not necessary that the retained employees constitute
a majority of the predecessor's work force. In United Maintenance & Mfg. Co., 214
N.L.R.B. 529, 87 L.R.R.M. 1469 (1974), where the predecessor work force numbered
thirty-eight and the successor, due to a strike, was able to recruit only fifteen employees
(nine of whom had worked for the predecessor), the Board held that the successor was
obligated to bargain: "[Tihe standard for determining the new employer's obligations to
bargain. . . is not. . . the percentage of the predecessor's total complement that the new
employer retains, but the percentage of the new employer's work force which had
previously worked for the predecessor in the bargaining unit." Id. at 533, 87 L.R.R.M. at
1473 (footnote omitted).
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had no duty to bargain since at that time twelve of the nineteen workers
were not holdovers and thus no majority existed.
In discussing the successor's duty to bargain, the Supreme Court in
Burns2' had noted that in some cases it would be perfectly clear that the
new employer planned to retain all of the former employees, and that it
would be appropriate for him to bargain with them immediately.14 5 In
other cases, however, the Court conceded that "it may not be clear until
the successor employer has hired his full complement of employees that
he has a duty to bargain with the union, since it will not be evident until
then that the bargaining representative represents a majority of the employees in the unit."246 In Pacific Hide, the Ninth Circuit noted that
while the parties had stipulated that Pacific reached its full complement
on June 6, when no majority existed, the more important inquiry was
whether the principles underlying the Burns "full complement" test had
been properly applied. Those principles make it implicit that the issue of
union representation is to be determined by the majority, whose rights are
considered paramount.
To achieve this aim, the Pacific Hide court had to define what was
meant by a "full complement." Rejecting any sort of mathematical
formula, it emphasized that determining the full complement could only
be accomplished "by considering the facts of each case in light of the
general goal which is sought-to assure majority rule within the new
employer's unit as to whether and if so with what union there must be
collective bargaining. " 247 The court observed that where the new employer does not hire a majority of his workers from the ranks of the
former employees, there is no reason to presume that the new majority
wishes to be represented by any one association. The new majority's
right of choice would be violated by requiring the employer to bargain
with the incumbent union. In that case, the employer is not a successor to
the majority of the employees; rather, "[hie is their original employer," 248 and the former bargaining relationship no longer exists.
Applying these principles to the facts, the court concluded that the
Board erred in ordering Pacific to bargain. While not suggesting that the
crucial date was June 6, the court concluded that considering such factors
as the plant's method of operation and the level of output to be main244. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
245. Id. at 294-95.
246. Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
247. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 1977).
248. Id. at 613-14. See NLRB v. John Stepp's Friendly Ford, Inc., 338 F.2d 833, 836
(9th Cir. 1964).
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tained, the "full complement" was nineteen, just one more than Cahen's
complement when it ceased operations. And while Cahen's complement
had fluctuated between twelve and eighteen, because Pacific had twelve
other plants, it would require nineteen employees in the unit to maintain a
steady output level. 24 9

The interpretation of the Burns "full complement" standard adopted
by the Ninth Circuit is consistent with the goal of upholding the rights of
the majority of the workers. The decision is beneficial in that it averts the
risk of imposing an unwanted union on a majority of the employees.
Moreover, since the predecessor's union can test its strength in a representation election, its status as the bargaining representative is not
completely foreclosed. In any event, the Pacific Hide decision is a
reminder that the interests of the majority of the workers is paramount in
ultimately determining the outcome of a bargaining representative's
dispute.
The Ninth Circuit has also examined the issue of whether a particular
union has majority status at the time of bargaining. In NLRB v. Vegas
Vic, Inc. , the employer had challenged the incumbent union's majority status, basing its challenge on the fact that fourteen of the twentyfour members of the bargaining unit were not members of the union.
Under the well-established rule of Brooks v. NLRB ,25 1 a union has
the benefit of what is usually referred to as an "irrebuttable" presumption that its majority continues for a period of one year after it has been
certified. The rationale behind this presumption is that it promotes
responsibility in the election process, affords the union ample time to
achieve results in bargaining without being "under exigent pressure to
I roduce hot-house results or be turned out," '2 2 minimizes inter-union
raiding and encourages serious bargaining by the employer without
attempting to undermine the union's majority status. z s Similarly, a union
whose bargaining rights have been secured through informal recognition
249. 553 F.2d at 614.
250. 546 F.2d 828 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 57 (1977).
251. 348 U.S. 96 (1954). There, even though it was demonstrated that within days after
the election the employees had unequivocally rejected the union, the fact that the employer had evidence that the workers no longer wished to be represented by the union did not
justify the employer's refusal to bargain.
252. Id. at 100.
253. Id. at 99-100. Extraordinary exceptions to this general rule are: (i) where the
certified union dissolves or becomes defunct; (2) where as a result of a schism substantially all the members and officers of the certified union transfer their affiliation to a new
local or international; and (3) where, the size of the bargaining unit fluctuates radically
within a short time. Id. at 98-99. In these instances the representative status of the union is
so subject to question that it is appropriate to free the employer of the duty to bargain and
permit a fresh assessment of employee preference.
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is entitled to a conclusive presumption of continued majority support

"for a reasonable time." 254 After the one-year period, the majority status
is still presumed to exist, but that presumption becomes rebuttable. 5
The burden of rebuttal is on the employer, and the governing rules were
recently reiterated by the Board in Bartenders, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employers BargainingAssociation :256
[O]nce the presumption is shown to be operative, a prima facie case
is established that an employer is obligated to bargain and that its
refusal to do so would be unlawful. The prima facie case may be
rebutted if the employer establishes either (1) that at the time of the
refusal the union in fact no longer enjoyed majority representative

status; or (2) that the employer's refusal was predicated on a goodfaith and reasonably grounded doubt of the union's continued ma257
jority status .
In addition, the good faith doubt asserted by the employer must be based

upon objective considerations,1 8 even though "subjective evidence may
be used to bolster the argument that such doubt existed at the relevant
9
25

time."
Applying these principles to the facts, the Vegas Vic court found that
the mere fact that slightly more than half of the bargaining unit members
did not belong to the union was not necessarily an indication of the
union's loss of majority status, and that the company's defenses for its

refusal to bargain were too "speculative and subjective" to give rise to a
good faith doubt. 26 An additional factor evidencing the company's lack
of good faith doubt cited by the court was its twenty-five year bargaining
history. The holding in Vegas Vic is consistent with decisions by the
254. NLRB v. San Clemente Publishing Corp., 408 F.2d 367, 368 (9th Cir. 1969). That
court said that "[t]o hold that only a Board-conducted election is binding for a reasonable
time would place a premium on the Board-conducted election and would hinder the use of
less formal procedures that. . . may be more practical and convenient and more conducive to amicable industrial relations." Id. Accord, NLRB v. Universal Gear Serv. Corp.,
394 F.2d 396 (6th Cir. 1968).
255. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279 n.3 (1972);
Automated Business Sys. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262,269 (6th Cir. 1974); Terrel Mach. Co. v.
NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
256. 213 N.L.R.B. 651, 87 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1974).
257. Id. at 651, 87 L.R.R.M. at 1195 (footnotes omitted).
258. Id. The employer's doubt may not rest on unfounded speculation or on a subjective state of mind only. NLRB v. Gulfmont Hotel Co., 362 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1966).
259. See Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1975).
260. 546 F.2d at 829. However, where evidence of a good faith doubt as to the
continuing majority status is introduced, the presumption of majority status disappears
and the burden shifts to the union to prove that it did represent a majority on the date in
question. Orion Corp. v. NLRB, 515 F.2d 81, 85 (7th Cir. 1975); accord, Automated
Business Sys. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 262, 270 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Board26 ' and other circuits262 which have reviewed similar challenges to
majority status in this context.
The issue of employer recognition of an exclusive bargaining agent
also arose in the context of an employer's relationship with competing
bargaining units. In-Buck Knives v. NLRB2 63 the employer was charged
with violating subsections 8(b)(1) and (2 )2 4 of the Act by prematurely
extending recognition to and entering into a collective bargaining agreement with a rival employees association. Under the Board's doctrine
established in Midwest Piping and Supply Co. ,265 an employer violates
the Act when it recognizes and enters into a contract with one union, after
another union has made known its claim of majority support and has filed
with the Board a petition for a representation election.2 66 Subsequently,
the Board expanded this doctrine with its holding that when an insurgent
union raises "a real question concerning representation" the employer is
barred from bargaining with an incumbent union at the termination of a
labor contract. 267 A question of representation is raised whenever the
claim of the rival union is not "clearly unsupportable and lacking in
substance;" it is not necessary for the rival union to present a formal
request for recognition.268
The Buck Knives court began its analysis with the acknowledgment
that the Midwest Piping doctrine had been applied with different results
in two distinct contexts. In a 1969 case, the Ninth Circuit was presented
with a situation in which several unions had confronted a non-union
employer; none of the unions had a history of collective bargaining with
the employer. 269 The Ninth Circuit held at that time that the employer
could not rely upon a check of signature cards without giving the rival
union the chance to demonstrate that the union recognized by the
261. See, e.g., Bartenders, Hotel, Motel & Restaurant Employers Bargaining Ass'n,
213 N.L.R.B. 651, 87 L.R.R.M. 1194 (1974), discussed at text accompanying note 256
supra.
262. See, e.g., Retired Persons Pharmacy v. NLRB, 519 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1975);
Terrell Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 427 F.2d 1088, 1090 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929
(1970).
263. 549 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1977).
264. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(1), (2) (1970).
265. 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 17 L.R.R.M. 40 (1945).
266. While the major rationale asserted by the Board is that such recognition delegates
to the employer the task given by statute to the Board of resolving "questions involving
representation," it was also held that by its recognition and contracting, the employer
indicated its approval of the signatory union, accorded it unwarranted prestige, encouraged membership therein, and rendered it unlawful assistance, all of which interfered
with the NLRA § 7 rights of the employees. Id. at 1069-70, 17 L.R.R.M. at 40-41.
267. Shea Chem. Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 1027, 1029, 42 L.R.R.M. 1486, 1487 (1958).
268. Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 477 F.2d 66, 69-70 (7th Cir. 1973).
269. Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 36 (9th Cir. 1969).

1978]

NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

company did not occupy majority status.2 7 ° In the second context, courts

have had to deal with situations in which several unions were competing
for exclusive recognition, with one of the unions currently representing
another bargaining unit of the same employer.2 7' If the employer had

extended recognition to one of the two competing unions on the basis of a
"clear demonstration of majority support," the courts have generally
refused to find a violation of the Act.272
Applying these principles to the Buck Knives facts, the court
concluded that the union fell within the second classification. The union

had an existing contract with the employer, and had clearly established
its majority support by the employees' vote in its favor.2 73 Since there
was no claim that the union's majority status was achieved as a result of
the employer's coercion or deception, 274 the company in recognizing the

union was merely obeying its duty to recognize the bargaining agent
represented by a majority of the employees; thus the employer could not
be guilty of an unfair labor practice.
IV.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. Secondary Boycotts
A secondary boycott may be defined as the application of economic
pressure upon a person with whom the union has no dispute, in order to
induce that person to cease doing business with another employer with
270. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), the Supreme Court affirmed
the rule that a union may establish its majority status by possession of cards signed by a
majority of the employees authorizing the union to represent them for collective bargaining purposes. That decision followed the Supreme Court's earlier holding in UMW v.
Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956), that where the union had authorization
cards from a majority of the employees, "[i]n the absence of any bona fide dispute as to
the existence of the required majority . . . the employer's denial of recognition of the
union would have violated § 8(a)(5) of the Act." Id. at 69.
271. See NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1042 (1975); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1972).
272. See, e.g., NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd., 507 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Suburban Transit Corp. v. NLRB, 499 F.2d 78, 83 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1089 (1974); Playskool, Inc. v. NLRB, 477 F.2d 66, 70 (7th
Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Peter Paul, Inc., 467 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1972); Moding Mfg. Co.
v. NLRB, 453 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1971).
273. Cf. NLRB v. Fishermen's & Allied Workers' Union Local 33, 483 F.2d 952, 953
(9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (employer committed unfair labor practice when it signed
contract with minority union competing for representation).
274. This is the exception to the rule that an employer may recognize a union on the
basis of a clear demonstration of support. See, e.g., NLRB v. Inter-Island Resorts, Ltd.,
507 F.2d 411, 412 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Playskool, Inc. v.
NLRB, 477 F.2d 66, 70 (7th Cir. 1973); NLRB v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 210 F.2d
501, 503 (7th Cir. 1954).
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whom the union has a dispute. 7 5 Thus, a union's attempt to induce
employees of Company A to engage in a work stoppage to extract
economic benefits during negotiations would be "primary" concerted
activity; if the union attempts to coerce Company B to cease doing
business with A, and that coercion takes the form of appealing to
employees of B to engage in a work stoppage, the union's pressure
becomes "secondary." The attempted withdrawal of services from B
pressures a person with whom the union has no underlying dispute, and
whose employment relations it does not seek to alter. The pressure is
therefore illegal. While in many cases it will be clear whether a secondary boycott exists, often the latent ambiguity of the text of the Act
of
requires the ultimate resolution to be guided by the legislative object 276
outlawing the common law secondary boycott. Griffith Co. v. NLRB
illustrates this process well.
Griffith Co. v. NLRB presented, as the court described, "a fairly
novel and important issue of labor law. ", 277 The Griffith court had to
decide whether a collective bargaining agreement which prohibited "an
employer from subcontracting work to any other signatory employer who
is delinquent in required payments to common employee fringe benefit
trusts" 278 constituted an illegal secondary agreement or was protected
under the doctrine of National Woodwork ManufacturersAssociation v.
NLRB.279 Griffith, a general contractor, had negotiated a master labor
agreement through a construction industry trade association. Under the
terms of the agreement each employer was required to contribute to
certain employee fringe benefit trust funds. 280 An employee's eligibility
for benefits depended upon hours worked, but had nothing to do with
whether his employer actually made contributions to the trust. If an
employer failed to make his contribution, all beneficiaries suffered reduced benefit levels but no employees were denied benefits altogether.
Over the years the trusts had experienced difficulty with delinquent
employer payments, and to counter this problem the union succeeded in
placing a clause in the master labor agreement which provided that no
contractor could subcontract work to a subcontractor who was delinquent
in trust payments. 281 Any employer who did so was then liable for the
275. National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
276. 545 F.2d 1194 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S.Ct. 171 (1977).
277. Id. at 1195.
278. Id.
279. 386 U.S. 612 (1967).
280. The trust funds were created pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (Supp. V 1975).
281. Paragraph 15 of the agreement provided:
The Trustees of the Trust Funds, through their Administrator, shall furnish each
Contractors Association and the Union, with a list of delinquent Contractors each
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delinquency of the subcontractor. 282 If the employer failed to make the
payments the union had a right to withhold services from him.2 83 The
trustees learned that Griffith was subcontracting work to a delinquent
subcontractor, and they demanded that Griffith pay the delinquency.
Griffith refused, and charged that the clauses constituted an agreement to
cease doing business with another in violation of section 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 284 and that certain threats to strike violated
section 8(b) of the Act.285
In reaching its decision, the Griffith court traced the distinction between primary 286 and secondary agreements, 287 but found that the agreement here fell neither under the rules established for "union standards"
month. The Contractor agrees that he will not subcontract any portion of his job to
any Contractor whose name appears on the delinquent list until such Contractor has
paid all delinquent monies to the various Trust Funds.
545 F.2d at 1196 n.l.
282. Paragraph 16 of the agreement read in part: "In the event the Contractor subcontracts to any such delinquent Subcontractor, in violation of the foregoing, the Contractor
shall be liable to the Trustees for all accrued delinquencies of the Subcontractor and shall
pay the sums over to the Trust Funds." Id.
283. Subsection (a) of Paragraph 16 provided: "Where the Contractor fails or refuses to
make payments required under the above provisions, the Union shall have the right to
withhold services from any or all jobs of such Contractor." Id.
284. Section 8(e) of the NLRA provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to
enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter, containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an
agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry
relating to the contracting and subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the
construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970).
285. Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA provides in part:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(4)() to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person
engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike. . .; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting,
or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . .: Provided, That nothing
contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise
unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing. . ..
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1970).
286. Where the union pressures an employer for an agreement regulating relations
between him and his own employees it is deemed to be lawful "primary activity."
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620 (1967).
287. 545 F.2d at 1199. The "core concept" behind a secondary boycott is "union
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clauses 288 nor under a new exception for "fringe benefit protection"
clauses .289 Therefore, in order to determine the legality of this agreement, the court turned to the standard established by the Supreme Court
in National Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB 2 90 for distinguishing between primary and secondary boycotts. That case directs a
court to inquire "whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the
union's objective was preservation of work for [primary] . . . employ-

ees, or whether the agreement and boycott were tactically calculated to
satisfy union objectives elsewhere." 2 9 The Court concluded that the
"touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to
the labor relations of the contracting employer" or whether it seeks to
benefit those "other than the boycotting employees or the employees of
the primary employer.' '292
Applying the National Woodwork standard, the Griffith court focused
first upon the tactical object of the boycott, and concluded that its object
was to interfere with the labor relations of the boycotted subcontractor
and not those of the primary employer, Griffith. The union's dispute with
the subcontractor was over alleged delinquencies to trust contributions,
and Griffith's only offense was doing business with that subcontractor.
Next, the court emphasized that primary activity must confer benefits
on the members of the relevant "work unit," and not on some larger
group such as members of the union in general.293 The court reasoned
that since employees of many work units were beneficiaries of the trust
pressure directed at a neutral employer the object of which [is] to induce or coerce him to
cease doing business with an employer [who is] engaged in a labor dispute." National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 622 (1967) (footnote omitted). An
example would be where the union puts pressure on a separate employer, so that it will
cease doing business with the union's employer and "bend his knee to the union's will!"
Id. at 637.
288. A typical union standards clause prohibits subcontracting of unit work to any
employer whose wages, hours, and working conditions are less favorable than those
enjoyed by the union. These clauses have been held primary because they serve to protect
the union by removing an employer's incentive to subcontract unit work to "substandard"
contractors in order to avoid paying union wages. 545 F.2d at 1202 n. 12.
289. Id. at 1198-99.
290. 386 U.S. 612 (1967). There, the Supreme Court considered a challenge under § 8(e)
of the Act to a provision in a labor contract which authorized carpenters to refuse to
handle doors which were pre-fitted (made ready for immediate installation) prior to
shipment to the jobsite; the object of this "product boycott" was held to be primary since
its purpose was to preserve the fitting work for the bargaining unit employees.
291. Id. at 644 (footnote omitted).
292. Id. at 645.
293. The court rejected the Board's finding that the relevant work unit was equivalent
to the respective bargaining unit. 545 F.2d at 1201 n.l 1.
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funds, by withholding services from delinquent subcontractors with the

object of eliminating those deficiencies, the union sought to benefit all of
its members. Thus, since the agreement was not substantially for the

benefit of the employees in the relevant work unit, it could not be
considered a lawful primary agreement.2 94
Thus, the Ninth Circuit refused to carve out another exception to

section 8(e) for secondary boycotts to collect overdue fringe benefit trust
contributions. The case is important for a number of other reasons. First,

it exemplifies the court's difficulty in distinguishing primary and secondary activity, due to the latent ambiguity of primary and secondary activity

in the Act itself. Second, it points to the difficulty in applying a test of the
"substantiality" or "directness"

of benefits to work units295 to distin-

guish primary activity and secondary activity, where as here, the trust
fund benefits both the members of the relevant work unit and the union at
large. Although the Court in National Woodwork admonished the courts

that the distinction between primary and secondary activity "will not
always be a simple test to apply,'
B.

'296

clearer guidelines are required.29 7

Discriminationby Employers

The NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer

to discriminate in regard to "any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.' '298
NLRB v. Electro Vector 2 99 involved a charge by the union that the
company had discriminated against striking employees, who were later

reinstated, by denying them year-end bonuses. 300 Reversing the order
of the Board, the court found that no violation of subsections 8(a)(1) and
(3) of the Act3° ' could lie because it had not been shown that there was
294. The court stated that "the benefits sought to be achieved by the clauses extend far
beyond the relevant work unit and . . . the benefits conferred on the work unit are no
more 'direct' or substantial than those conferred on other units." Id. at 1202 (footnotes
omitted).
295. For a discussion of a suggested test to be used, see Note, A RationalApproachto
Secondary Boycotts and Work Preservation, 57 VA. L. REv. 1280, 1297-300 (1971).
296. 386 U.S. at 618 (footnote omitted).
297. See note 295 supra.
298. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
299. 539 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 64 (1977).
300. The National Labor Relations Act provides in § 8(a):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization ....
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3) (1970).
301. Id.
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employer discrimination with respect to "any term or condition of
employment" as required by section 8(a)(3) of the Act.302
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that while a
regularly paid bonus may come to be relied upon by employees as part of
total compensation, 30 3 and thus it may become a term or condition of
employment, a bonus must "have been paid over a sufficient length of
time to have become a reasonable expectation of the employees and,
therefore, part of their anticipated remuneration.' '3 4 Here the court
found that since the cash bonus had only been given for two years and
was agreed to by the owner informally, the bonus was a gift rather
than a wage. Therefore, any refusal to pay the bonus could not be
employer discrimination with respect to any term or condition of employment.
NLRB v. Tayko Industries3°5 involved a situation where shortly after
an election petition had been filed with the Board,3 ° 6 the employer
granted raises to seven members of the bargaining unit. It was charged
that this action violated section 8(a)(1) of the Act.3 7 The president of the
company had testified that he was aware of the pending election when he
authorized the wage increases, but that this knowledge did not influence
the wage increase. Despite his denials of anti-union sentiment, the court
found that the "increases could not avoid having an influence upon the
pending election." 30 8 The court based its decision on NLRB v. Exchange
Parts Co. ,309 a Supreme Court case holding that an actual grant of
benefits during an election campaign, given with the intention of inducing employees to reject the union, is unlawful; the employees might
interpret such a gesture as a demonstration of employer economic power
302. See note 300 supra. See also E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d
1245, 1248 (4th Cir. 1973).
303. 539 F.2d at 37. See also Century Elec. Motor Co. v. NLRB, 447 F.2d 10, 14 (8th
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. Harrah's Club, 403 F.2d 865, 874 (9th Cir. 1968).
304. 539 F.2d at 37 (quoting NLRB v. Nello Pistoresi & Son, Inc., 500 F.2d 399, 400
(9th Cir. 1974)).
305. 543 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1976).
306. Section 9 of the Act generally describes the procedures and rules regarding
representatives and elections. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970).
307. Section 8(a) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
" 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (1970). Section 157
guaranteed in section 157 of this title ....
provides in part that: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargainId. § 157.
ing or other mutual aid or protection ....
308. 543 F.2d at 1122.
309. 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
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held in reserve, which could just as readily be used for reprisals.31° The
Ninth Circuit and other courts have generally held that absent a showing
by the company of a proper business purpose or necessity, the announce-

ment of a wage or benefit increase during the pendency of an election is
itself evidence of unlawful motive. 3 11 Therefore, while the inference of

an illicit employer motive may be dispelled if the employer demonstrates
that the grant was compelled by business necessity or by consistent past

practice, 312 the position of the courts, as illustrated by the instant case, is
that finding anti-union sentiment is not essential to a determination that
there was an unfair labor practice when the employer actually imple-

ments improvements in the course of an election campaign.
In Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB3 13 the petitioners had
raised the wages of their employees unilaterally, without prior notice,
while the union and the company were engaging in collective bargaining
negotiations. The union charged that this activity violated section 8(a)(5)
of the Act 3 14 since it circumvented the duty of the company to negotiate
the terms of the work agreement directly with the union representative.

31 5

The company defended its action on the ground that the raise was
consistent with a long-standing practice and thus a continuation of the
310. Id. at 409-10. The Court said:
The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside
the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future benefits must flow and
which may dry up if it is not obliged.
rd. at 409 (footnote omitted).
311. See, e.g., NLRB v. Styletek, 520 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1975); J.P. Stevens & Co.
v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972); J.C. Penney Co. v. NLRB, 384 F.2d 479, 485
(10th Cir. 1967).
312. One court held that a prima facie violation was established by showing that the
benefits were granted while an election was pending, writing: "It is obvious that the closer
a wage benefit comes to the day of the election, the harder it will be for the union to
answer, and the greater the danger that the benefit will be manipulated to sway the
election." NLRB v. Styletek, 520 F.2d 275, 281 (1st Cir. 1975). See also J.P. Stevens &
Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 493 (4th Cir. 1972) (wage increase held lawful when all other
business competitors had granted increase). Cf. NLRB v. Gotham Indus., Inc., 406 F.2d
1306 (1st Cir. 1969) (where employer demonstrates proper business purpose for pay
increase prior to election, burden on NLRB to show primary motivation was anti-union
sentiment).
313. 560 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1977). Other aspects of this case are discussed at notes 16786 supra and 353-54 infra and accompanying text.
314. Section 8(a)(5) provides that "(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer. . . (5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
315. In declaring this practice unlawful, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S.
736 (1962), pointed out that the practice serves to disrupt the position of the union
negotiators, inhibit the discussion of the issues at the bargaining table, and that "such
action is necessarily inconsistent with a sincere desire to conclude an agreement with the
union." rd. at 745 (footnote omitted).
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status quo. 3 16 The company maintained that it did not attempt to avoid

bargaining collectively with the union or attempt to interfere with the
collective bargaining process. The company's corporate parent claimed it
had a policy of paying non-union employees of its subsidiaries according
to the wage scale of a rival union.
The court found that although the practice may have been longstanding with respect to other bargaining units, it was not a bargaining
policy firmly established for the Queen Mary employees. Since there
existed no status quo within this bargaining unit, the pay raise did
interfere with the rights of the employees to bargain collectively. Thus,
in determining whether a change in terms of employment during collective bargaining is a departure from the status quo, the test is whether it is
a departure from the prior policy of the particular bargaining unit, and not
the policy of the employer with respect to other bargaining units.
In Mt. Vernon Tanker Co. v. NLRB3 17 the question presented was
whether it is an unfair labor practice to require a seaman, without the
presence of a union representative, to take part in a "logging," a
procedure in which the seaman is given notice of an entry in the ship's
log relating to misconduct with which he is charged. The court distinguished the case of NLRB v. . Weingarten, Inc. 318 and held that due to
the special master-servant relationship aboard a ship, coupled with the
inherent nature of a "logging," it was not an unfair labor practice for
seamen to be denied a union representative during a "logging" procedure.
In Weingarten, a clerk who had been suspected of taking food from a
lunch counter was called in by a store detective for questioning. She
requested the presence of a union representative, but her request was
denied. In finding a violation of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, 319 the
316. The employer is free to grant general wage increases while negotiating if they are
consistent with past company policy. As was stated in NLRB v. Ralph Printing &
Lithographing Co., 433 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971):
"Where there is a well-established company policy of granting certain increases at specific
times, which is a part and parcel of the existing wage structure, the company is not
required to inform the union and bargain concerning these increases." Id. at 1062.
Thus, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 871, 79 L.R.R.M. 1621 (1972),
the Board upheld an employer's unilateral grant during contract negotiations of a cost-ofliving pay increase, where the increase was consistent with a known company policy and
was tied objectively to government statistics. A wage increase during contract negotiations is also lawful if it follows a pattern of automatic increases at fixed intervals. NLRB
v. Southern Coach & Body Co., 336 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1964).
317. 549 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1977). See also notes 36-48 supra and accompanying text.
318. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
319. Section 8(a)(l) prohibits an employer from interfering with the rights of employees
to engage in collective bargaining, organization, and other mutual aid or protection
procedures. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
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Supreme Court upheld the Board's conclusion that section 7 of the Act
"creates a statutory right in an employee to refuse to submit without
union representation to an interview which he reasonably fears may result
in his discipline.' '320 The basis of that right was founded upon the
national labor policy which protects the exercise by workers of their

freedom to associate, organize, and choose representatives for mutual aid
and protection.321
In Mt. Vernon, however, the Ninth Circuit found that the logging

procedure was not an investigatory interview reasonably likely to result
in discipline as that term is used in Weingarten. A "logging"

is a

proceeding in which a seaman is given formal notice of charges against
him, and, since the proceeding is mandated by law, the captain cannot
choose to dispense with the interview. The court also based its decision
on the grounds that the section 7 right to engage in concerted activities

for the purpose of mutual aid and protection is largely inapplicable to a
ship at sea, due to the peculiar role of the captain as master of the ship.32 2
While conceding that an order of the captain during the course of a

voyage might form the basis of an unfair labor practice charge, the court
emphasized that the captain's need for absolute authority, in order to

preserve the lives of passengers and crew, as well as the safety of ship
section 7 right inapplicable during the
and cargo, made this particular
323
voyage.
ship's
a
of
course
C. Discriminationby Labor Organizations

The NLRA provides that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to
discriminate against any employee on any ground other than the mem320. 420 U.S. at 256. The contours and limits of the statutory right were stated by the
Court to be:
First, the right inheres in § 7's guarantee of the right of employees to act in concert for
mutual aid and protection. . . .Second, the right arises only in situations where the
employee requests representation. . . .Third, the employee's right to request representation as a condition of participation in an interview is limited to situations where
the employee reasonably believes that the investigation will result in disciplinary
action. . . .Fourth, exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate employer
prerogatives. . . .Fifth, the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview.
Id. at 256-59.
321. Id. at 261-62 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970)).
322. The court noted that many ordinary labor practices were inappropriate at sea and
that "it may be doubted that concerted activities of seamen for mutual aid or protection,
when in opposition to the directions of the ship's master, are to be tolerated at all during
the course of a voyage." 549 F.2d at 575.
323. Id. The court also noted that workers at sea have been the beneficiaries of
ameliorative legislation to protect their well-being at sea. Id. at 576 (quoting Southern S.S.
Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 38-39 (1942)). See 46 U.S.C. §§ 651-692 (1970).
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ber's failure to tender periodic membership dues, 324 or for a union to
cause an employer to discriminate against an employee with respect to
any term of employment.325
In H.C. Macaulay Foundry v. NLRB,3 26 an employee who was

officially on leave to recover from injuries received a letter from the
union stating that he would be discharged if his back dues were not paid
on or before "the first pay day." ' 327 The employee interpreted the letter
as requiring him to pay his dues on the first payday after his return to
work. The union, however, was unaware of the employee's absence from
work and when payment did not come immediately, it requested the
employer to discharge him for non-payment of dues. Since the employer
and the union had a valid security clause requiring employees covered by
the agreement to become and remain members of the union, the company
discharged the employee as per the agreement.
The court held that due to the fiduciary duty that a union owes to an
employee, 328 where the union creates an ambiguity concerning an employee's payment of dues which results in the employee's discharge, the
union bears the responsibility for the ambiguity. Since it was reasonable
for the employee to assume that the deadline for payment of dues was the
first payday after his return, rather than the first payday after receipt of
the letter, the union violated section 8(b)(2) of the Act by initially
requesting the employee's termination.329
The court further held that the employer violated the Act 330 by failing
to inquire into the circumstances behind the union's demand that the
employee be discharged. This duty arises where the employer knows of
circumstances that would cause him to question the propriety of the
324. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).
325. Id.
326. 553 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1977).
327. Id. at 1200.
328. See NLRB v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees' Local 568, 320 F.2d 254, 258 (3d
Cir. 1963).
329. 553 F.2d at 1201. Section 8(b)(2) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in
violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section or to discriminate against an employee
with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or terminated
on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (1970).

330. Section 8(a)(3) provides, in part:
[N]o employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee for non-membership in a labor organization . . .(B) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that
membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and initiation fees uniformly required as a
condition of acquiring or retaining membership . .

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).

..

1978]

NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

" ' In determining this duty, the factors to be considered are
discharge. 33
the nature of the facts known to the employer and the degree of
doubt that they would raise as to the legality of the union's action;
the burden that further inquiry would impose on the employer; and
the likelihood that an investigation would lead to prompt and certain
resolution of the employer's uncertainty.332
Since it would have been a minimal burden for the company to investigate the requested discharge by simply telephoning the union officials,
the company violated its duty to investigate imposed by the Act.33 3 The
court held that the union terminated
its liability when it requested that the
334
employee.
the
reinstate
company
NLRB v. InternationalLongshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
Local 13335 involved several charges of unfair labor practices against the
union. Under a hiring hall agreement for longshoremen, registered
"Class A" longshoremen were given first preference in dispatch to
longshore jobs; second preference was given to limited registered men
who were "Class B." Class A registrants were normally union members,
while Class B registrants generally were not. The union's policy for
several years required that applicants for Class B membership be sponsored by Class A registrants. The practical consequences were that
virtually all sponsors were union members.
The court held that the union's requirement that all applicants for Class
B hiring hall status be sponsored by Class A members, almost all of
whom were union members, constituted an unfair labor practice in
violation of the National Labor Relations Act. 33 6 The court found that
since the "natural effect of this sponsorship practice would be to encourage membership in the union by creating a discrimination in hiring in
favor of Class B registrants who had been sponsored by Union members,', 33 7 the union sponsorship plan unlawfully encouraged union mem331. 553 F.2d at 1202. See NLRB v. Zoe Chem. Co., 406 F.2d 574, 580 (2d Cir. 1969).
332. 553 F.2d at 1202.
333. See note 330 supra.
334. 553 F.2d at 1202.
335. 549 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 397 (1977). See also text accompanying notes 93-104 supra.
336. It was found that the union had violated subsections 8(b)(1)(A) and 8(b)(2) of the
Act. 549 F.2d at 1350. Subsection 8(b) provides in part: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization or its agents

. . .

to restrain or coerce.

. .

employees in

the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
Subsection 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization "to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section ....
" Id. § 158(b)(2). Subsection 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer
from discriminating in a manner which encourages or discourages membership in a union.
Id. § 158(a)(3).
337. 549 F.2d at 1352-53.
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bership in violation of the Act.33 Further, it was found that the union
violated its duty of fair representation by giving a referral preference to
Class B members over non-registered workers. 339 By insisting upon the

sponsorship system, the union violated its duty to represent fairly all of
the employees in the unit, including those Class B applicants who were
without sponsors.
NLRB

v. Local 30, International Longshoremen's & Ware-

housemen's Union 34° involved a union petition for review of a Board
finding that the union was guilty of an unfair labor practice. A former
member of the union was found to have crossed the union's picket line,
and was assessed a fine of $3,150. The picket line was subsequently
declared illegal. When the union threatened to bring suit to collect the
fine, the member filed unfair labor practice charges. The union defended
its conduct on the grounds that its action in fining its former member was
exempt under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act 341 as intra-union discipline. In
reiterating the internal affairs exemption postulated by the Supreme
Court in Scofield v. NLRB, 342 the Local 30 court pointed out that the
union discipline for refusing to honor an illegal picket line violated two of
the requirements announced by the Supreme Court: first, that the union
discipline reflect a legitimate union interest; and second, that the disciplinary action impair no national policy Congress has embodied in the labor
laws .34
338. For a discussion of subsections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(1), (2), see Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
339. Under the duty of fair representation the exclusive bargaining agent has a statutory obligation to "serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination
toward any," to exercise its discretion with "complete good faith and honesty," and to
avoid arbitrary conduct. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964). Later, the
Supreme Court held that the union's obligation in determining whether to process or settle
a grievance was not merely to refrain from patently wrongful conduct such as racial
discrimination or personal hostility. Rather, the Court held that even "arbitrary" decisions by the union in the context of grievance processing were wrongful. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967). See also notes 212-13 supra and accompanying text.
340. 549 F.2d 698 (9th Cir. 1977).
341. Id. at 702. Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides, in part, that a labor organization shall have
the right "to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970).
342. 394 U.S. 423 (1969). The Court stated that section "8(b)(l) leaves a union free to
enforce a properly adopted rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no
policy Congress has imbedded in the labor laws, and is reasonably enforced against union
members who are free to leave the union and escape the rule." Id. at 430.
343. 549 F.2d at 702. This decision is consistent with the position taken by the other
circuits, i.e., that union discipline will be invalidated where it operates to impair national
labor policy. See, e.g., Verville v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 520 F.2d 615 (6th
Cir. 1975); Local 1104, Communication Workers v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1051 (1976).
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D. Labor OrganizationRequests for Information
As an incident to the duty to bargain collectively with the union, an
employer is required to furnish relevant information so that the union can
bargain effectively on behalf of its members. 4
In San Diego Newspaper Guild Local 95 v. NLRB,34 5 the union had
requested information on certain employees being trained by the
company to replace union members in the sole event of a strike. The
company refused on the grounds that those employees were not doing
any work within the covered work unit. The issues presented were
whether the union was entitled to this information, and whether the
company's refusal to furnish it constituted an unfair labor practice under
subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act."
Recognizing that an employer has a duty to furnish sufficient information to the union to enable it to engage in informed collective bargaining, 34 7 the Local 95 court focused upon the initial requirement that the
information requested must always be relevant to the bargaining process. 34 8 Since this request was for information concerning employees
outside of the bargaining unit,34 9 the union had the burden of showing
that the requested information was relevant to legitimate bargaining
issues. 350 Since the requested information was only relevant for the union
to determine if the company had violated the collective bargaining
agreement, the issue arose as to how great a showing the union must
344. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967).
345. 548 F.2d 863 (9th Cir. 1977).
346. Subsections 8(a)(1) and (5) provide:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(]) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of this title;

(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees,

subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1970).
347. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967); Standard Oil Co. v.
NLRB, 399 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1968). The duty is based upon the belief that a union is
unable to perform its essential function as bargaining agent without such information and
without it no meaningful bargaining could take place.
348. As noted in Emeryville Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 883 (9th Cir.
1971): "The first question [is] . . .always one of relevance. If the information requested
has no relevance to any legitimate union collective bargaining need, a refusal to furnish it
could not be an unfair labor practice."
349. Where the requested information is intrinsic to the core of the employer-employee
relationship such as wage data, the information is considered presumptively relevant. Id.
at 887. In that instance the employer has the burden to prove a lack of relevance.
Prudential Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969).
350. See, e.g., NLRB v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 410 F.2d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 1969).
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make in order to obtain the information. The court answered that "the
showing by the union must be more than a mere concoction of some
general theory which explains how the information would be useful" but
less than "an initial, burdensome showing. ' 351 The solution "is to
require some initial, but not overwhelming, demonstration by the union
that some violation is or has been taking place.'"352 Since the union failed
to make any initial showing that the company had violated the labor
contract, the company's refusal to give the information was lawful.
In a related case, Queen Mary Restaurants Corp. v. NLRB, 353 the
Ninth Circuit held that the employer had committed an unfair labor
practice when it delayed fulfilling its duty to supply the union during
contract negotiations with the company's current health and welfare
plans and seniority information. Since the information was relevant to the
issues being negotiated,354 the company's failure to supply the information promptly constituted an unlawful refusal to bargain in good faith.
E. Employer Liability for Actions of Agents
The NLRA defines "employer" as any person acting as an agent of an
employer, directly or indirectly, 355 and "supervisor" as an individual
who is required to exercise
independent judgment in his control over the
356
employment of others.
In NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,357 the employer attempted to
avoid a finding of an unfair labor practice by arguing that two of its shop
managers who had pursued a course of illegal anti-union conduct were
not "supervisors" within the meaning of the Act.358 Relying on a similar
Ninth Circuit case,35 9 the court held that whether an employee is a

"supervisor" is irrelevant where the employer acted through the employee. 3 1 The decision in PacificSouthwest Airlines regarding the responsi-

351. 548 F.2d at 868-69.
352. Id. at 869.
353. 560 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1977).
354. See note 349 supra.
355. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
356. Id. § 152(11).
357. 550 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1977).
358. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970) states:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign,
reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the
foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature,
but requires the use of independent judgment.
359. NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970).
360. This is consistent with the intent of Congress, which in 1947 declared in substance
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bility of the acts of the employer for employees is consistent with
3 61
decisions in other circuits.
V.

LABOR ORGANIZATION LIABILITY TO MEMBERS

A.

ImproperDiscipline of Members

In general, a union is free to enforce internal rules which reflect a

legitimate union interest and are enforced only against members who are
free to leave the union and escape the rules. 36 2 However, any coercion
used to discourage a member's access to the NLRB or the courts is
considered beyond the legitimate interests of a labor organization. 363 The

Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA)3 4 protects
the right of a union member to bring suit against a union for its wrongful
acts.
The Ninth Circuit recently decided two cases involving alleged violations of the LMRDA. 365 In the first case, Ross v. InternationalBrotherhood of Electrical Workers,366 a union official, Ross, had won reelection, but the regional vice president of the union ordered a new
election and refused to install him. Ross then filed suits in state and
federal court seeking to enjoin the new election, order his installation,
and receive damages in tort against the union. Eventually Ross won the

new election, but, as a result of his state and federal court suits, he was
subjected to internal union charges of violating the IBEW's constitution,
which required its members to exhaust internal union remedies for four
months before resorting to the courts.3 67 He was found guilty and assessed a fine of $10,000, but the assessment was subsequently enjoined.
that the usual principles of vicarious liability under the law of agency are to be applied to
both the union and to the employee. Section 101(2) of the NLRA was amended to include
within the term "employer" any person "acting as an agent" of an employer. National
Labor Relations Act Amendment, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 137 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970)). In addition, § 152(13) was added, providing: "In determining
whether any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make such person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually
authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling." 29 U.S.C. § 152(13) (1970).
Section 152(13) permits the Board to impute to the employer not only actions expressly
authorized but also those which are impliedly authorized. J.S. Abercrombie Co., 83
N.L.R.B. 524, 24 L.R.R.M. 1115 (1949), enforced, 180 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1950).
361. See, e.g., Donovan v. NLRB, 520 F.2d 1316, 1319 (2d Cir. 1975), cert denied, 423
U.S. 1053 (1976); NLRB v. Broyhill Co., 514 F.2d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1975); NLRB v.
Dayton Motels, Inc., 474 F.2d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 1973).
362. Scofield v. NLRB, 384 U.S. 423 (1969).
363. NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
364. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
365. Id.
366. 544 F.2d 1022 (9th Cir. 1976).
367. Id. at 1023-24 n.1.
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The issue presented to the court was whether the IBEW had the right to
discipline Ross for bringing suit against it. Section 411(a)(4) of the
LMRDA, the so-called "bill of rights" of union members, 368 provides:
No labor organization shall limit the rights of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court. . .: Provided, That any such member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing procedures (but
not to exceed a four-month lapse of time) within such organization,
before instituting legal or administrative proceedings against such
369
organizations or any officer thereof ....

The statute indicates that union members "may be required to exhaust
reasonable hearing procedures" for up to four months. However, the
court noted that this language was not intended to abrogate case law
which holds that the "reasonableness," and thus the propriety of requiring exhaustion of intra-union remedies, depends on the circumstances of
each case. 370 Therefore, while unions are authorized to have hearing
procedures for up to four months, the courts may in their discretion
entertain a complaint, even though these procedures have not been
exhausted. 371 The court refused to sustain the union's challenge based on

and entertained jurisdiction under section 412
the four-month provision,
372
of the LMRDA.

The Ross court also rejected the union's claim that Ross was precluded
from bringing suit under section 411(a)(4) because section 482 provided
the exclusive remedy to actions concerning election disputes. 37 3 Relying
on a previous Ninth Circuit decision 374 the court held that section 411
(a)(4) was not limited by the nature of the member's suit, 375 and that the
368. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970).
369. Id.
370. See NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1968).
371. Id. at 428. The Supreme Court noted that while in some cases the four-month
allowance may be required, it was not intended to be a grant of authority for unions to
police their members more stringently, but rather a statement of policy that the courts may
in their discretion "stay their hands for four months, while the aggrieved person seeks
relief within the union." Id. at 426.
372. The right to sue for violations of § 411 is provided in § 412, which reads in part:
"Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been
infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a district court of
the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C.
§ 412 (1970).
373. Section 482 provides that a member challenging the validity of an election shall
follow internal union remedies for three months; if he has not obtained a final decision
within that time he may file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, who will investigate
the charges. 29 U.S.C. § 482 (1970). Section 483 makes this remedy for challenging an
election exclusive. Id. § 483.
374. Operating Eng'rs Local 3 v. Burroughs, 417 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 916 (1969).
375. Under facts essentially similar to those in the instant case, the court in Burroughs
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section's protection for a union member applies even when that member
has brought a suit that will be dismissed for failure to follow the

procedure required by sections 482 and 483.376 That Ross' actions were
predicated upon his interest in retaining his office was immaterial, for the
Supreme Court in Hall v. Cole37 7 had made it clear that title I of the
LMRDA "was specifically designed to protect the union member's right
to seek higher office within the union.'

'378

The alleged distinction be-

tween the rights of a member and the rights of an officer was similarly
rejected, as the protection afforded under section 411 applies equally to

both. 379 Finally, the court found no merit in the union's contention that
Ross was not "assessed," rather than "fined," since the levy, no matter
how it was labeled, served to limit Ross' right to sue in contravention of
LMRDA mandates.
The second Ninth Circuit decision concerning a union member's rights
under the LMRDA was Phillips v. InternationalAssociation of Bridge
Workers Local 118. 38 0 In that case, a dispute 38 1 had arisen between the

plaintiffs, union members, and defendants, the union and several of its
officers. As a result, plaintiffs filed suit in Nevada, the state where the
dispute had arisen. Defendants responded by bringing actions against

plaintiffs in California state court as well as in federal court for the
Eastern District of California. Plaintiffs then filed another suit against
defendants, alleging malicious prosecution 382 and asserting federal rights
under, inter alia, title I, section 101 of the LMRDA. 383 The trial court

dismissed the plaintiffs' action on the grounds that the complaint failed to
noted that the word "action" in § 411 (a)(4) "is in no way limited and there is nothing in the
Act which distinguishes between suits involving member as opposed to employee rights,
[or] between suits involving internal as opposed to external union problems." Id. at 373
(footnote omitted).
376. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Rank & File Comm. v. Amalgamated Clothing
Workers Joint Bd., 473 F.2d 1303, 1306 (3d Cir. 1973).
377. 412 U.S. 1 (1973).
378. Id.at 14.
379. See Cooke v. Orange Belt Dist. Painters No. 48, 529 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1976);
Sewell v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 445 F.2d 545,550 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1024 (1972); Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d
340, 343-44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 920 (1964).
380. 556 F.2d 939 (9th Cir. 1977).
381. The nature of the disputes is not revealed by the court.
382. Plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that
the [defendants'] actions were brought to cause [plaintiffs] to expend their financial
resources in defense and thus make it difficult for them to pursue their Nevada
actions; and that the actions were brought "to punish and reprimand plaintiffs for
daring to bring action in the courts of the United States and the State of Nevada
against these defendants .
556 F.2d at 940.
383. 29 U.S.C. § 411 (1970). A right to sue for violations of § 411 is provided by Id.
§ 412. See note 372 supra.
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state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 38 4 and the plaintiffs
appealed.
The Ninth Circuit noted that under section 411 (a)(5) of the LMRDA:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended,
expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for nonpayment of dues by
such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member has
been (A) served with written, specific charges; (B) given a reasonable3 time
to prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair
85
hearing.
Thus, the question, as the court saw it, was "whether malicious prosecution of a civil suit by a labor organization or its officers acting in their
official capacity against a member constitutes 'discipline.' "386 The court
noted that section 411 (a)(5) does not prohibit all union discipline but only
prohibits "improper disciplinary action," i.e., disciplinary action undertaken in the absence of the specific safeguards prescribed by the section.387
Drawing on the reasoning of a recent Second Circuit opinion, 388 the
court decided that when the alleged disciplinary action is in fact an
invocation of a legal process, such as the institution of a civil suit, then
the safeguards of section 411(a)(5) will necessarily be provided. The
judicial proceedings themselves provide a union member with notice of
the specific charges underlying the union's suit qua disciplinary action,
time to prepare a defense, and a full and fair hearing. 38 9 Further, "if the
judicial process was invoked improperly against the union member, he
will have the full range of remedies provided by law."390 Thus, the court
concluded that "malicious prosecution is not 'discipline' within the
meaning of § 411(a)(5) and thus cannot constitute a violation of that
subsection.' '391
However, the court arrived at a different result when it considered
section 411(a)(4) of the LMRDA. That section provides, in pertinent
part:
384. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
385. 556 F.2d at 941 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970) (emphasis in original)).
386. 556 F.2d at 941. See generally Beaird & Player, Union Discipline of Its Membership Under Section 101(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin: What is "Discipline" and How Much
Processis Due?, 9 GA. L. REV. 383 (1975); Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1969).
387. 556 F.2d at 941. See note 386 supra and articles cited therein.
388. See Morrissey v. National Maritime Union, 544 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1976) (union
procured arrest of member on charges of criminal trespass and disorderly conduct).
389. 556 F.2d at 941.
390. Id.
391. Id. at 942.
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No labor organization shall limit the right of any member thereof to
institute an action in any court, or in a proceeding before any
administrative agency, irrespective of whether or not the labor organization or its officers are named as defendants or respondents in
such action or proceeding ....392
In deciding whether the malicious prosecution of a civil suit by a union
against a member serves to "limit the right" of that member to institute
actions, the court relied on the case of Operating Engineers Local 3 v.
Burroughs.3 93 In Burroughs, the Ninth Circuit held that the disciplining
of a member for bringing suit against the union without first exhausting
the union's internal hearing procedures constituted a violation of subsection 41 1(a)(4). While the discipline in Burroughs was in the nature of
a union-imposed fine, the court in Phillips saw no reason to distinguish
such fines from malicious prosecution of civil suits, inasmuch as they
both tend to inhibit the member's exercise of his right to institute civil
suits.3 95 As the court explained, "If a union member's right to sue is to
have any meaning, courts must be ever vigilant in protecting that right
against indirect and subtle devices as well as against direct and obvious
limitations.' '396 Consequently, the court held that the plaintiffs had stated
a legally cognizable claim under subsection 411(a)(4).3 97 The district
court's ruling was reversed, and the case was remanded.3 98
B. Duty of FairRepresentation
Although the Labor Management Relations Act does not expressly
establish a duty on the part of unions to fairly represent all employees
within the bargaining unit for which the union is certified, such a duty
has been held to be implicit in that act.3 99 The union breaches its duty
392. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(4) (1970).
393. 417 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 916 (1969).
394. Id. at 373-74. Accord, Ross v. IBEW, 544 F.2d 1022, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1976). The
Ross court also relied on Burroughs in ruling that despite an employee's failure to invoke
internal union procedures for resolving election disputes, as required by 29 U.S.C. § 482
(1970), and despite his institution of a civil suit, the union's action in disciplining him for
bringing the suit was nevertheless violative of § 41 1(a)(4). The Ross court cited Burroughs
for the rule that § 411 (a)(4) is not limited by the nature of the member's suit. 544 F.2d at
1024. Thus, "[siection 411(a)(4) establishes protection for a union member that applies
even when that member has brought a suit that will be dismissed for failing to following
[sic] the procedure required by §§ 482 and 483." Id. See text accompanying notes 366-79
supra.
395. 556 F.2d at 942. See IBEW Local 1186 v. Eli, 307 F. Supp. 495, 500 (D.Hawaii
1969) (§ 411 (a)(4) protects "against reprisals as well as against more formal limits" on right
to sue).
396. 556 F.2d at 942.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
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only when its manner of dealing with a member is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. "4I In two cases within the survey period the
Ninth Circuit held that while fair representation precludes complicity
between a union and an employer to ignore valid grievances, it does not
require the union to pursue claims which the union reasonably judges to
be without merit.
In Hughes v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters Local 683, 401
union member Hughes claimed his employer had assigned him to the
"lowest paying and most arduous tasks" because of his insistence that
the employer comply with the strict letter of the collective bargaining
agreement. Shortly thereafter he was fired, allegedly for poor performance. When his union refused to bring the matter of his discharge to
arbitration, Hughes filed suit. The district court granted summary judgment4 2 in favor of the union, finding that the union had acted on the basis
of relevant considerations 0and
without arbitrariness, capriciousness or
4 3
discriminatory motivation.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit observed that "[i]n order to state a claim
for breach of fair representation an employee need only show 'arbitrary
or bad-faith conduct on the part of the Union in processing his grievance.' "404 He or she need not allege that the union participated in fraud
or deceitful conduct. 4°5
Acknowledging the issue to be "a close one,"4°6 the court concluded
that the pleadings and affidavits presented below "raised an inference of
complicity between [the union] and [the employer] . . . sufficient to
withstand the motion for summary judgment. - 4 07 Among the factors the
court cited in support of its conclusion were: (1) affidavits from Hughes'
fellow employees and employees of companies engaged in similar work
stating that "employees who stood firm on enforcing the collective
bargaining agreement were fired at the first opportunity their employers
had to 'legitimately' discharge or demote them;"8 (2) evidence that the
union had frequently responded to members' complaints by telling them
330, 337 (1953). See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199 (1944) (Railway

Labor Act).
400. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
401. 554 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1977).
402. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.

403. 554 F.2d at 367.
404. Id. (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 193 (1967)).
405. 554 F.2d at 367. See Duggan v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 510 F.2d 1086,
1088 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975); Beriault v. Local 40, Super Cargoes &
Checkers, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974).
406. 554 F.2d at 367.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 368.

1978]

NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

"not to rock the boat," or by promising action and then doing nothing; 409
and (3) the perfunctory nature of Hughes' interview with the union's
attorney. 410 Since Hughes "raise[d] an inference as to [the union's]
improper motivation in refusing to arbitrate his discharge, "411 the district
court's grant of summary judgment was reversed and the case was
remanded for further proceedings.412
In Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,413 plaintiff was a clerk at a local
Safeway store who refused to wear a tie on the job, as required by
Safeway's dress code. He claimed that such a requirement constituted
sex discrimination.414 As a result, he was suspended from work and, in
due course, fired. When he complained to his union, it advised him to
return to work wearing a tie and informed him that it would not pursue
his claim because, in the opinion of the union's counsel, he had a "bad
case.' '415 Plaintiff filed suit alleging, inter alia, that the union had
wrongfully refused to process the grievance stemming from his discharge. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
union, and plaintiff appealed.416
The Ninth Circuit noted that plaintiff's claim against the union was
inextricably tied to the merits of his case against Safeway.4 17 Declaring
of plaintiff's action as a "bad case" was
that the characterization
"perhaps generous, ' 418 the court ruled that regulations requiring male
employees to conform to different dress and grooming standards than
female employees do not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 419 Having so found, the
court held that the union's refusal to pursue appellant's grievance was not
a breach of its duty of fair representation.420 "To refuse to process a bad
case is in itself not arbitrary. Such a refusal is most reasonable and in fact
essential to the grievance and arbitration system."42
409. Id.
410. "Ostensibly an effort to gather the facts, the interview merely consisted of [the
union attorney] asking appellant to admit or deny [the employer's] charges against him
without giving appellant sufficient opportunity to qualify his answers." Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 369.
413. 555 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1977).
414. Id. at 755.
415. Id.

416. Id.
417. Id. at 756.
418. Id.at 755.
419. Id. See Baker v. California Land Title Co., 507 F.2d 895, 896-98 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
420. 555 F.2d at 757.
421. Id. at 756-57. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
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INJUNCTIONS

In 1932 Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act,4 22 in part to
protect the growing labor movement from the debilitating effect of
injunctions.4 23 Language contained in the subsequently enacted Labor
Management Relations Act, 424 however, seemed to run counter to both
the policy and rules that had been set forth in the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.42 This apparent conflict in congressional intent and its attendant
problems were resolved by the Supreme Court in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union Local 770,426 decided in 1970. Today, when a court
is requested to provide injunctive relief against a labor organization, its
of
task is no longer one of reconciling inconsistent legislation but one
427
situation.
the
to
applicable
is
Markets
Boys
determining whether
Injunctions against management, on the other hand, have not been
plagued by the difficulties described above. Nevertheless, they frequently give rise to special problems of their own. The recent Ninth Circuit
case of Amalgamated Transit Union Division 1384 v. GreyhoundLines,
Inc. 428 is illustrative. In its original opinion 429 the Ninth Circuit affirmed

the issuance of a preliminary injunction under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act4"' compelling the employer, Greyhound
Lines, Inc. (Greyhound), to maintain the status quo pending arbitration
of a dispute concerning Greyhound's right under the collective bargain43
ing agreement to unilaterally change the work cycles of bus drivers. '
This judgment was vacated by the Supreme Court432 and the case was
remanded for further consideration in light of Buffalo Forge Co. v.
United Steelworkers.
422. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1970).
423. See Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 250-51
(1970); 29 U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
424. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
425. See note 460 infra.
426. 398 U.S. 235 (1970). See note 460 infra.
427. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 959, 557
F.2d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussed at notes 459-474 infra and accompanying text).
See generally Note, Federal Labor Policy and the Scope of the Prerequisitesfor a Boys
Market Injunction, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 328 (1975).
428. 550 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1977).
429. Transit Union, Div. 1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 529 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.),
vacated, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
430. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
431. Greyhound desired to "change the work cycles of bus drivers operating the
Vancouver-Seattle and Seattle-Portland runs from their existing cycles of six days on,
three days off, and four days on, three days off, respectively, to a straight weekly regimen
of five days on and two days off." 529 F.2d at 1075.
432. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Transit Union Div. 1384, 429 U.S. 807 (1976).
433. 428 U.S. 397 (1976). See note 464 infra. In Buffalo Forge, the Court ruled that a
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On reconsideration, the Ninth Circuit reached a different result. In a

brief but significant decision, the court declared that "[w]hile a promise
[by an employer] to submit a dispute to arbitration may justify a finding
of an implied duty not to strike .

. .

, such a promise [by a union] does

not imply a duty on the part of the employer to preserve the status quo
pending arbitration." 4 34 The difference, according to the court, stems
from the fact that a union's strike pending arbitration will generally
interfere with and disrupt the arbitration process to which the parties have

bound themselves, while an employer's alteration of the status quo will
not. "The implication of a duty not to strike may be 'essential to carry
out promises to arbitrate and to implement the private arrangements for
the administration of the contract.' "435 In addition, the court noted that
in the event the arbitrator ruled against Greyhound, "the situation can be
restored substantially to the status quo ante. '"436 For these reasons, the
court held that the injunction had been improperly entered. 437
VII.

JUDICIAL

A.

REVIEW

OF LABOR DECISIONS

Arbitration Decisions

There is a strong federal policy favoring peaceful resolution of labor
disputes through binding arbitration.4 38 In furtherance of this policy, the

courts have consistently refused to review the merits of a dispute which
the parties have submitted to arbitration under an agreement binding
them to the award.4 39 Only when the arbitrator exceeds his authority, as

defined by the parties in their collective bargaining agreement or in their
preliminary injunction could not properly issue against a union engaged in a sympathy
strike in support of sister unions, despite the presence of a no-strike clause in the
collective bargaining agreement and the arbitrability of the question of whether the
union's actions were in violation of that agreement. The Boys Markets exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia Act (see note 460 infra) did not apply since "the strike was not over any
dispute between the Union and the employer that was even remotely subject to the
arbitration provisions of the contract." Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 407. The Court
reasoned that, under the circumstances, the quid pro quo for the union's promise not to
strike, Le., the employer's promise to arbitrate labor disputes, was absent. See note 463
infra. Consequently, an injunction enforcing the no-strike provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement was not permissible. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 237-38 (1970) (grievance within arbitration agreement) (discussed
in note 460 infra).
434. 550 F.2d at 1238.
435. Id. at 1239 (quoting Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 411).
436. 550 F.2d at 1239. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 254 (1970) (finding of irreparable injury) (discussed in note 460 infra).
437. 550 F.2d at 1239.
438. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974); Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). See also 29 U.S.C. § 171 (1970).
439. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
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stipulation of issues to be resolved, 440 or when the arbitration proceedings
fail to meet requirements of fundamental fairness (e.g., notice, a full and
fair hearing)," will the courts refuse to uphold the arbitration award.
In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters Local 117 v. Washington
Employers, Inc. ,442 the Ninth Circuit upheld an arbitration award based
on state statutes despite a possible conflict with federal labor law. In this
case a group of Washington fish wholesalers entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with the Teamsters Union. Six days after the
agreement was signed, the Federal Pay Board put into effect certain
regulations which set a ceiling of 5.5 percent on wage increases in new
labor agreements." 3 Since the wage increases under the collective bargaining agreement were in excess of Pay Board guidelines, the employers informed the union that they would seek a ruling from the Pay Board
as to the propriety of the increases. The employers further stated that the
increases would be withheld pending the Pay Board's decision, but that
they would be implemented retroactively if approval was obtained. 4
The union argued that the employers were obligated to pay the increases
and demanded that the issue be settled through the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the collective bargaining agreement. 44 In
addition, the union claimed that, under Revised Code of Washington
sections 49.52.050446 and 49.52.070," 4 the employers would have to pay
double damages to those employees affected by the withholding of the
wage increases. These statutes provide that where an employer has
willfully paid an employee a wage lower than the one specified by
contract between the parties, the employer is guilty of a misdemeanor
and may be held liable to the employee in a civil action for an amount
equal to twice the total of the wages withheld.
When the employers refused to arbitrate the dispute, the union filed
suit in federal district court to compel arbitration under the collective
596 (1960); Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817, 819 (5th
Cir. 1973); Henderson v. Eastern Gas & Fuel Assocs., 290 F.2d 677, 680 (4th Cir. 1961);
Woolley v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1957); Bower v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 214 F.2d 623, 625 (3d Cir. 1954).
440. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960);
Meat Cutters Local 540 v. Neuhoff Bros. Packers, Inc., 481 F.2d 817, 819 (5th Cir. 1973).
441. See Bower v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 214 F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1954).
442. 557 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1977).
443. 36 Fed. Reg. 21,790 (1971).
444. 557 F.2d at 1346-47.
445. Id. at 1347. The agreement provided for the resolution of any dispute or grievance
between the union and the employer through a series of internal adjudicatory steps,
culminating in "final and binding" arbitration to resolve disputes not settled internally.
Id. at 1347 n.I.
446. WASH. REv. CODE § 49.52.050 (1974).
447. Id. § 49.52.070.
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bargaining agreement. 448 Shortly thereafter, the Pay Board approved the
wage increases and they were implemented retroactively. Thus, the only
remaining issue was the union's claim that its employees were entitled to
double damages under Washington law. The union dismissed its suit
without prejudice in exchange for the employers' stipulation to arbitrate
this issue. 449 The arbitrator found that the employers had willfully withheld the wages due the employees and that the relevant statutes made the

award of double damages mandatory. 4 0 When the employers refused to
comply with the award, the union filed suit to enforce it under section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA).451
On appeal from a district court decision against the union,452 the
employers argued that the arbitrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by
basing his award on state statutes in conflict with, and preempted by,
federal law. In particular, they contended that, in light of the need for
uniformity in the law governing collective bargaining agreements, section 301 of the LMRA preempted all state legislation in that area. 453

448. 557 F.2d at 1347. Suits by and against labor organizations, including suits to
compel arbitration under collective bargaining agreements, are authorized by § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). See Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 449-56 (1957); Haig Berberian, Inc. v. Cannery Warehousemen, 535 F.2d 496, 498 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1976); Engineers Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope
Co., 251 F.2d 133, 134-35 (2d Cir. 1957).
449. 557 F.2d at 1348.
450. Id. The arbitrator based his conclusion on the Pay Board regulations which, he
declared, made it "abundantly clear" that implementation of the wage increases was
-permitted unless and until the Pay Board acted favorably on the employers' challenge. Id.
451. See note 448 supra.
452. The district court held for the employers on two grounds: (1) that WASH. REV.
CODE § 49.52.070 (1974) was preempted insofar as it applies to collective bargaining
agreements governed by federal law (see note 453 infra); and (2) that the award was
unenforceable since federal labor policy under 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) precluded an award
of punitive damages. 557 F.2d at 1349. In fact, the courts are divided on the issue of
whether and when such damages may be awarded. See, e.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Michelson's Food Servs., Inc., 545 F.2d 1248, 1254 (9th Cir. 1976); Butler v. Yellow
Freight Sys., Inc., 514 F.2d 442, 454 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975);
Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 291-92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975);
Williams v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 421 F.2d 1287, 1289 (9th Cir. 1970).
453. 557 F.2d at 1349-50. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977).
When Congress has unmistakably declared that its enactments alone are to regulate a
particular aspect of interstate commerce, state laws regulating that aspect of commerce
are preempted. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). "This result is compelled
whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 525; City
of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. at 633. Of course, regardless of
whether Congress has manifested an intention to preempt all state legislation in the field,
congressional enactments override all state laws with which they directly conflict. U.S.
CONST. art. VI.
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The Ninth Circuit held that a ruling on whether the Washington

statutes conflict with section 301 was unnecessary since the employers
had waived any objections to the arbitrator's authority when they agreed
45 4
to submit the issue of their liability under those statutes to arbitration.
The court noted the employers' stipulation that the "sole issue" upon
which the arbitrator was to rule was whether the employers' actions
violated the relevant statutes.45 5 "[H]aving agreed to submit the issue of
their liability under [the statutes] to binding arbitration, the Employers
may not now be heard to challenge the applicability of those statutes. "456
The court also rejected the employers' argument that enforcement of
the punitive damage award would be inconsistent with federal labor
policy and, thus, contrary to public policy. Acknowledging the possibility that "the application of state statutes such as those at issue would
frustrate the federal interest in a uniform federal law of collective bargaining agreements," 457 the court nevertheless viewed the effect of
enforcement in this particular case as de minimis: "[W]e think that the
strong federal policy in favor of the peaceful and speedy resolution of
industrial disputes through binding arbitration far outweighs any possible
adverse impact.' '458

Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. v. InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters Local 959459 involved several important questions regarding an
arbitrator's jurisdiction vis-a-vis that of the federal courts. Of particular
interest was the issue of whether a federal court's refusal to issue a Boys
Markets injunction' against a striking and picketing union has any
454. 557 F.2d at 1350 (citing Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 988 (1965)).
455. 557 F.2d at 1347.
456. Id. at 1349. Accord, Santos v. District Council of Carpenters, 547 F.2d 197, 201
(2d Cir. 1977) (one who loses in arbitration may not ask court to redetermine the merits of
his claim); Meat Cutters Local 195 v. Cross Bros. Meat Packers, Inc., 518 F.2d 1113, 1121
(3d Cir. 1975) (loser in arbitration proceeding not permitted to raise, for the first time,
objection to arbitration panel after award has been made).
457. 557 F.2d at 1350. This language suggests that the Ninth Circuit might have been
willing to overturn the Washington statutes if the question of their validity had properly
been before the court.
458. Id. at 1350-51.
459. 557 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1977).
460. In a landmark case, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398
U.S. 235 (1970), the Supreme Court sought to reconcile the explicit language of § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), with § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970). Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides,
in part:
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order
or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any
labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such
from doing. ., any of the following acts:
dispute
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effect upon an arbitrator's jurisdiction to assess the propriety of that
picketing under the parties' collective bargaining agreement.461
Aleyska Pipeline Service Co. (Aleyska) is a consortium of eight oil

companies responsible for building the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
(TAPS). Aleyska entered into a comprehensive collective bargaining

agreement with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and its local
affiliates, including Local 959. This agreement, entitled the TAPS
Agreement, took effect on April 29, 1974 and covered work and occupations relevant to the pipeline project.
On August 4, 1976, Local 959 set up a picket line on the only road
leading to the Valdez terminal, a key project construction site. The
picketing grew out of a dispute between Local 959 and a subcontractor
performing services at the Valdez site, over the assignment of certain

"backhaul" work. In response to this union action, Aleyska filed suit in
district court seeking both injunctive relief and damages for breach of the
TAPS Agreement no-strike provision. 62
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
Ce) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
. by any. . . method not involving fraud or violence ....
29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). Under this language, federal courts would appear to have no
jurisdiction to enjoin a union from striking and/or picketing.
On the other hand, § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185
(1970) authorizes suits by and against labor organizations for the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements, which agreements frequently contain no-strike clauses. See note
448 supra and cases cited therein. A suit under § 301 against a union for the enforcement
of a no-strike clause in a collective bargaining agreement is, in effect, a request to enjoin a
union from striking. Such a request is potentially in conflict with the Norris-LaGuardia
anti-injunction language.
In Boys Markets, the Court created a narrow exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It
held that injunctive relief against a striking union is permitted where: (1) the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties contains a mandatory arbitration or adjustment
procedure; (2) the court finds that the strike stems from a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate; and (3) the court orders the employer to arbitrate as a
condition to his obtaining an injunction against the strike. 398 U.S. at 253-54. In addition,
such an injunction, like all injunctions, must be warranted under ordinary principles of
equity. Id. at 254. The Court reasoned
that the unavailability of equitable relief in the arbitration context presents a serious
impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary establishment of a
mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes, that the core purpose of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act is not sacrificed by the limited use of equitable remedies to
further this important policy, and consequently that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does
not bar the granting of injunctive relief in the circumstances of the instant case.
Id. at 253. See generally Note, FederalLabor Policy and the Scope of the Prerequisitesfor
a Boys Market Injunction, 19 ST. Louis L.J. 328 (1975).
461. 557 F.2d at 1266.
462. Sections 1 and 3 of Article VII of the TAPS Agreement provided, in relevant part,
as follows:
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On August 6, 1976, the district court issued a temporary restraining
order prohibiting picketing at the terminal site. However, Alyeska's
motion for a preliminary injunction was subsequently denied on the
grounds that the dispute underlying the picketing was not within the
compulsory arbitration clause of the TAPS Agreement. 63 The court
ruled that the fact that the agreement contained a general no-strike
provision could not, by itself, serve as the basis for a Boys Markets
injunction.'
Alyeska then instituted arbitration proceedings, as authorized by the

TAPS Agreement, for a determination of whether the union had violated
the agreement's no-strike provision. The arbitrator ruled that a violation
had in fact occurred and he ordered the union to stop picketing the Valdez
site. Alyeska then obtained a permanent injunction enforcing the arbitrator's award. 465 The union appealed and presented several arguments to

the Ninth Circuit.
First, the union argued that the district court's initial refusal to issue a
Boys Markets injunction deprived the arbitrator of jurisdiction to determine whether the picketing itself violated the TAPS Agreement. The
1. During the term of this Project Agreement, there shall be no strikes, picketing,
work stoppages, slowdowns or other disruptive activity for any reason by the Union
or by any employee, and there shall be no lockout by the Contractor.
3. The Union shall not sanction, aid or abet, encourage or continue any work
stoppage, strike, picketing or other disruptive activity at the Project site and shall
undertake all possible means to prevent or to terminate any such activity. No employee shall engage in activities which violate this Article. Any employee who participates
in or encourages any activities which interfere with the normal operation of the
Project shall be subject to disciplinary action, including discharge.
557 F.2d at 1265 n.1.
463. 557 F.2d at 1265. Cf. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 237-38 (1970) (grievance within agreement) (discussed in note 460 supra). The
Supreme Court has reasoned that since the union's promise not to strike is usually the quid
pro quo for the employer's undertaking to submit grievance disputes to the process of
arbitration, "the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike should be construed as
having coterminous application." Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 382 (1974).
Thus, a union may be enjoined froth striking only when the court concludes that the
dispute giving rise to the strike is one which both parties are contractually bound to
arbitrate. Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 228 (1962) (dissenting opinion,
adopted in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 254 (1970)).
464. 557 F.2d at 1265. See Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,409
(1976) (5-4 decision) ("[A]side from the enforcement of arbitration provisions . . . permitted by Boys Markets, the Court has never indicated that the courts may enjoin actual
or threatened contract violations .

. .

. The allegation of the complaint that the Union

was breaching its obligation not to strike did not in itself warrant an injunction."). Buffalo
Forge is discussed in note 433 supra and accompanying text.
465. 557 F.2d at 1265-66. Under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), federal
district courts have jurisdiction to hear suits seeking enforcement of arbitration awards.
See, e.g., La Mirada Trucking, Inc. v. Local 166, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 538 F.2d 286,
288 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 787 (1977) (discussed in note 474 infra).
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court pointed out that in assessing the propriety of an injunction under
Boys Markets, the inquiry should focus on the nature of the dispute
giving rise to the picketing.466 Such an inquiry does not concern itself
with the question of whether the picketing itself constitutes a breach of

contract.467 Thus, "[t]he propriety of the union's picket was an issue
reserved for the arbitrator."468

Second, the union argued that the arbitrator had no authority to
determine the validity of the picketing activity because the underlying
dispute which caused the picketing was outside the scope of the TAPS
Agreement. 469 The court agreed that the subject of the dispute was not

expressly covered by the agreement but declared that this fact did not
eliminate the arbitrator's jurisdiction over the picketing question. The
court observed, "Authority or jurisdiction to arbitrate a grievance
'should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that

the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the
asserted dispute.' "470 The court found that the arbitration clause of the
" ' was susceptible of such an interpretation, and hence
TAPS Agreement47
the arbitrator's authority was properly exercised.

Finally, the union argued that it should not have been bound by the

TAPS Agreement when representing the particular employees involved
since it had not been representing them at the time it signed the agree-

ment. 472 The court rejected this argument, pointing out that the arbitrator
had already ruled on the issue. It reiterated that
[t]he interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement is a question
for the arbitrator. . . . [S]o far as the arbitrator's decision concerns
construction of the contract, the courts have no business overruling
him . . . . An award is legitimate if it draws its essence from the
466. 557 F.2d at 1266 (citing Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397
(1976)). See note 463 supra.
467. Indeed, in a suit under § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), judicial inquiry
must be strictly confined to the question whether the reluctant party did agree to
arbitrate the grievance." United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 582 (1960) (emphasis added).
468. 557 F.2d at 1266.
469. Id. Article III, § I of the TAPS Agreement declared that the Agreement
"shall apply to the new construction work performed by the Contractor." 557 F.2d at 1266
n.3. The union argued that the "backhaul" work over which the dispute had arisen was
not "new construction work."
470. 557 F.2d at 1266 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960)).
471. Article VII, § 4 of the TAPS Agreement. This section is not set forth in the
opinion, but its provisions are described by the court. 557 F.2d at 1265.
472. 557 F.2d at 1267. The TAPS Agreement, which Local 959 had signed, went into
effect on April 29, 1974. Thereafter, the employees of Chicago Bridge and Iron elected
Local 959 as their bargaining agent. Id. at 1264.
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agreement and only when the arbitrator's words manifest an infideli-

ty to this obligation [to construe the agreement] may the courts
refuse enforcement of the award. 473

The court was not prepared to say that the arbitrator had "manifest[ed]
an infidelity" to the TAPS Agreement when he found that it was binding
on the employees. Consequently, the arbitration decision was upheld,4 74

and the district court's decision to issue a permanent injunction was
affirmed.
473. Id. at 1267 (quoting San Fiancisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Tribune Publishing Co., 407 F.2d 1327, 1327 (9th Cir. 1969)). See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). See also United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960). But see General Tel. Co. v. IBEW Local 89,
554 F.2d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1977) (Anderson, J., dissenting) (arbitration award enforced
notwithstanding fact that "arbitrator's interpretation was gleaned from the parties' prior
conduct and from an examination of their intent as evidenced in earlier negotiations.").
Cf. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 117 v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d
1345, 1350 (9th Cir. 1977) (voluntary submission/stipulation to arbitration supplements
arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreement and cures any defects therein) (discussed at notes 442-58 supra and accompanying text); Amicizia Societa Navegazione v.
Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
843 (1960) (same).
474. 557 F.2d at 1268.
Other recent Ninth Circuit cases in which an arbitration award was upheld include
General Tel. Co. v. IBEW Local 89, 554 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1977) (see note 473
supra); Krieter v. Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc., 558 F.2d 966 (9th Cir. 1977) (per
curiam); and La Mirada Trucking, Inc. v. Local 166, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 538 F.2d 286
(9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 787 (1977). In Krieter, the collective bargaining
agreement provided for the resolution of disputes through referral to a system board of
adjustment or, by mutual agreement, through submission to arbitration. When a dispute
arose as to the validity of Lufthansa's discharge of Krieter, the parties agreed to submit
the dispute to an arbitrator. The arbitrator ruled against the airlines, and his award was
enforced by the district court. Lufthansa appealed, contending that because the arbitration procedures had not followed those outlined in the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§
157-159 (1970) (see generally Part VIII, A infra) the award was impeachable (see 45 U.S.C.
§ 159 (1970)) (the airlines apparently argued that the arbitration procedure contravened id.
§ 157 which provides that disputes between carriers and their employees may be resolved
by an arbitration board consisting of three persons). The court, relying on Ficek v,
Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1964), summarily dismissed this argument by
pointing out that "[a] claimant may not voluntarily submit his claim to arbitration, await
the outcome, and, if the decision is unfavorable, then challenge the authority of the
arbitrators to act." 558 F.2d at 968 (quoting Ficek, 338 F.2d at 657). Accord, International
Bhd. of Teamsters Local 117 v. Washington Employers, Inc., 557 F.2d 1345, 1346 (9th
Cir. 1977) (discussed at notes 442-58 supra and accompanying text).
In La Mirada Trucking, the issue before the arbitrator was whether the work performed
by several independent truck owner-operators was "on-site" work such as to bring them
within the scope of the master agreement between the employers' association and the
local unions. The arbitrator concluded that the work in question was "on-site," even
though it involved the transportation of sand along a five-mile stretch of public highway.
The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, declaring it "reasonable." 538 F.2d at 289. See
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 599 (1960). Also,
after examining the language of the arbitrator's memorandum, the court rejected the
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B.

NLRB Decisions

In those cases decided during the survey period which required the
Ninth Circuit to review a decision of the National Labor Relations Board,

the court rigorously adhered to well established judicial rules detailing
the proper scope of such a review. The rule that a reviewing court will

not disturb the Board's findings if, "on the record as a whole there is
substantial evidence to support . . . [the] findings" 475 resulted in the
enforcement of Board decisions in numerous cases.4 76 Similarly, several

cases 477 applied the long-standing Ninth Circuit rule that Board determinations as to the credibility of witnesses appearing before it will not be

disturbed "unless a clear preponderance of the evidence convinces that
they are incorrect.

' 478

In NLRB v. STR, Inc. ,79 the court invoked the Ninth Circuit rule
that, absent extraordinary circumstances, the Board's findings of fact
employers' contention that the arbitrator had exceeded the boundary of the submission
made to him. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 117 v. Washington Employers,
Inc., 557 F.2d at 1346 (discussed at notes 442-58 supra and accompanying text); Holly
Sugar Corp. v. Distillery Workers Int'l Union, 412 F.2d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 1969); San
Francisco-Oakland Newspaper Guild v. Tribune Publishing Co., 407 F.2d 1327, 1328 (9th
Cir. 1969).
There appears to have been no decision during the survey period in which enforcement
of an arbitration award was denied. Cf. Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 541 (9th Cir.
1977) (NLRB decision to defer to aibitration award reversed) (discussed at notes 148-62
supra and accompanying text).
475. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951). See 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1970).
476. See, e.g., NLRB v. Goodsell & Vocke, Inc., 559 F.2d 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 1977);
NLRB v. Squire Shops, Inc., 559 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Timberland
Packing Corp., 550 F.2d 500, 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 397 (1977); NLRB v.
Stockton Door Co., 547 F.2d 489, 490 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
122 (1977); cf. NLRB v. Tayko Industries, Inc., 543 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1976) (portion of
Board's order denied enforcement since Board's findings not supported by substantial
evidence on the record as a whole) (discussed at notes 305-12 supra and accompanying
text).
477. See NLRB v. R.O. Pyle Roofing Co., 560 F.2d 1370, 1371-72 (9th Cir. 1977);
NLRB v. Anthony Co., 557 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussed at notes 12-18 supra
and accompanying text); Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipe Fitting
Indus. Local 525 v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Where the trier of fact
has made explicit findings crediting the testimony of witnesses for one side and has given
no credit to witnesses for the other side, we are especially reluctant to overturn his
conclusions."); NLRB v. Dodson's Market, Inc., 553 F.2d 617, 619 (9th Cir. 1977)
(discussed at notes 105-16 supra and accompanying text).
478. NLRB v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Local 27, 514 F.2d
481, 483 (9th Cir. 1975). See NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842, 846 (9th Cir. 1967);
NLRB v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Local 10, 283 F.2d 558, 562
(9th Cir. 1960).
479. 549 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
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will be deemed uncontroverted unless the objecting party raises objections in a timely motion requesting the Board to reconsider its decision.4 80 Also, the court noted that the "extraordinary circumstances"
exception to this rule applies only to circumstances that are exceptional
,481 "not
because they cause the party to omit filing timely 4objections
82
because the Board's order was itself extraordinary."
Despite these deferential standards, however, the court concluded in
NLRB v. Pacific Southwest Airlines,483 that the interests of effective
appellate review require that the Board "clearly articulate the reasons

behind any order, and particularly why other remedies [are] found to be
inappropriate." 4
VIII.

PROCEEDINGS UNDER OTHER LABOR

ACTS

A. Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act (RLA) 485 was originally enacted in 1926,
almost a decade before passage of the National Labor Relations Act. 48 6 It
represents "a pioneer federal attempt to secure the peaceful settlement of
employer-employee disputes.''487 This initial legislation was, understandably, aimed at the railway and related industries 488 which, at that
time, were the principal carriers of goods and passengers in interstate
commerce.

89

As Congress viewed the situation in 1926, the primary

cause of strikes and disruption in the railway industry was the inability of
480. Id. at 642 (citing NLRB v. Selvin, 527 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1975)). See
NLRB v. Ochoa Fertilizer Corp., 368 U.S. 318,322 (1961); NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber
Co., 327 U.S. 385, 387-88 (1946); 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1970) ("No objection that has not
been urged before the Board . . .shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or
neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances
.... ").The Board's regulations permit parties to file motions within 20 days after
service of a Board decision for the purpose of seeking reconsideration of the decision. 29
C.F.R. § 102.48(d) (1976).
481. See, e.g., NLRB v. Marshall Maintenance Corp., 320F.2d 641,643 (3d Cir. 1963);
NLRB v. Central Mercedita, Inc., 273 F.2d 370, 373 (1st Cir. 1959); NLRB v. International Woodworkers Local 13-433, 238 F.2d 378, 379 (9th Cir. 1956).
482. 549 F.2d at 642.
483. 550 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussed at notes 79-92 supra and accompanying
text).
484. Id. at 1152.
485. Pub. L. No. 69-257,44 Stat. 577 (1926) (now codified, as amended, at 45 U.S.C. §§
151-188 (1970)).
486. Pub. L. No. 74-198,49 Stat. 449 (1935) (now codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970
& Supp. V 1975)).
487. O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alas., Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977).
488. See 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1970) (definition of "carriers").
489. O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alas., Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977). In 1936, the
Act was amended to cover air carriers and their employees. Pub. L. No. 74-487, 49 Stat.
1189 (1936) (now codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1970)).
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labor and management representatives to formulate equitable labor

contracts. 4 Thus, the RLA as originally enacted created procedures and
federal administrative machinery geared to facilitate the process of
491
selecting bargaining representatives and reaching labor agreements.

By 1934, however, Congress perceived another major source of

conflict in the railway industry: disputes as to existing rights and interpretation of existing agreements.492 When the RLA was amended that
year, 493 Congress created new administrative machinery to interpret and
apply existing agreements in light of particular fact situations.4 94
The two types of disputes, those stemming from the creation and/or

alteration of labor agreements and those arising from interpretations
and/or applications of existing agreements, have traditionally been
known as "major"

and "minor" disputes, respectively. 495 The impor-

tance of classifying labor-management disputes as major or minor lies in
the fact that parties to minor disputes are compelled to arbitrate their

grievances before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, 4 6 or one of
the other statutorily mandated boards of adjustment 49 7 empowered to

make binding awards which are reviewable and enforceable in the
courts.4 98 On the other hand, parties to major disputes may, after having
attempted in good faith to negotiate a resolution, 499 employ the services

of the National Mediation Board if they so choose, 5°° but they are free to
resort to self-help measures if voluntary attempts at resolution prove

futile. 501

490. O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alas., Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977). See
generally Garrision, The National RailroadAdjustment Board: A Unique Administrative
Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
491. O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alas., Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1977); see, e.g.,
45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 154, 155, 157 (1970). See generally Garrision, The National Railroad
Adjustment Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
492. O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alas., Inc., 551 F.2d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1977); see Elgin,
Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945).
493. Railway Labor Act, Pub. L. No. 73-442, 48 Stat. 1185 (1934).
494. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 153, 155 (1970); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711,
722-28 (1945).
495. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-24 (1945). See Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30, 33 (1957).
496. See 45 U.S.C. § 153(i) (1970); Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322
(1972); Walker v. Southern Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 196, 198 (1966).
497. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 184, 185 (1970); cases cited note 496 supra.
498. See 45 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1970); Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 322
(1972).
499. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 724-25 (1945).
500. See 45 U.S.C. § 155 (1970).
501. See id.; Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725 (1945); REA Express,
Inc. v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 459 F.2d 226, 230 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 892
(1972).
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Because the modes of resolution specified for major and minor disputes are different, the nature and extent of the judicial role in the
50 2
resolution process depends upon the classification of the dispute.
Illustrative of the problems that tend to arise in this regard is the recent
case of O'Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc.50 3 O'Donnell involved a

dispute between an airline (Wien) and a pilots' union over the number of
pilots to be assigned to each Boeing 737 flight. 504 Prior to the commencement of the suit, the parties had entered into a number of short-term
agreements specifying that each 737 flight would carry three pilots, but
these agreements did not purport to represent a long-term resolution of
the issue. To avoid being locked into a three-pilot commitment, Wien
would assign newly employed pilots to third-pilot status and then discharge them within one year.505 The discharged pilots would thereafter be
aircraft. This practice became known as the
rehired for service on other
5°6
procedure.
"fire-hire"
The union filed suit in district court seeking injunctive relief against
the "fire-hire" procedure. Wien countered with a motion, apparently in
the alternative, for dismissal or for summary judgment. The district court
granted Wien's motion in its entirety, dismissing the action with prejudice and, at the same time, rendering summary judgment in favor of
Wien.50 7 The union appealed.
Recognizing that the third-pilot issue was a major dispute, 50 8 the Ninth
Circuit formulated the issue as "whether the fire-hire policy is so intimately tied to the crew complement dispute

. . .

that the very nexus

converts the entire context into a major dispute.'' 09 The court then
observed that if the fire-hire issue was a minor dispute, the district court
502. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 153-155 (1970); Andrews v. Louisville & N.R.R., 406 U.S. 320,
325 (1972); Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945).
503. 551 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1977).
504. Id. at 1142-43. The dispute arose in 1968 when Wien announced it would introduce
the 737's into its service. The union argued that three pilots should have been assigned to
each 737 flight, while Wien maintained that only two pilots were required. Similar disputes
are apparently widespread in the airline industry. Id. at 1143 & n. I.
505. Under the basic agreement between Wien and the union, the terms of which were
incorporated into the short-term agreements prior to suit, pilots employed for less than
one year were on a probationary status and were not entitled to the benefit of the
grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the contract. Id. at 1143.
506. Id.
507. Id. at 1145. The appellate court observed that this result was "both inconsistent in
itself and improper." Id. at 1145 n.4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
508. Changes in rules and working conditions are regarded as major disputes, which
may be submitted to the National Mediation Board. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 155, 156 (1970);
Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-28 (1945).
509. 551 F.2d at 1147.
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should have dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction;5 1 ° and if it was a

major dispute, an injunction preserving the status quo would have been
required, if warranted by the situation. 5 1 The court concluded that

neither view adequately supported the grant of summary judgment.512
To aid the district court in subsequent determinations, the court
reiterated the Ninth Circuit test for distinguishing major from minor
disputes: a dispute is minor if "the position of at least one of the parties
[is] arguably predicated on the terms of an agreement.'

'513

The judgment

was reversed and the case remanded.
5 14
InternationalIn-Flight Catering Co. v. National Mediation Board

involved the sensitive question of when, if ever, federal courts have
jurisdiction to review the National Mediation Board's (NMB) action in
certifying a bargaining representative under section 2, Ninth of the
515
RLA.
In 1974, pursuant to a request by the International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Airline Division (Teamsters), the NMB conducted a section
2, Ninth investigation 1 6 and found a representation dispute among the
510. Id. at 1148. See notes 496-98 supra and accompanying text.
511. Id. at 1148. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, 155, 156, 181 (1970); United Transp. Union v.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 505 F.2d 542, 543 (3d Cir. 1974); United Transp. Local 31 v. St.
Paul Union Depot Co., 434 F.2d 220,223 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 925 (1971).
The basis upon which the status quo is to be determined for the purposes of RLA
injunctions is set forth in Detroit & T.S.L.R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142,
152-59 (1969).
512. 551 F.2d at 1148.
513. Id. at 1146. The leading Ninth Circuit case on the major-minor distinction is
Switchmen's Union v. Southern Pac. Co., 398 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1968). It has been
observed that every circuit that has addressed the issue has followed Switchmen's. United
Transp. Union v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 505 F.2d 542, 544 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1974). See
Local 1477, United Transp. Union v. Baker, 482 F.2d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 1973); IBEW v.
Washington Terminal Co., 473 F.2d 1156, 1172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
906 (1973).
514. 555 F.2d 712 (9th Cir. 1977).
515. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970).
516. Section 2, Ninth of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970) provides, in relevant
part:
If any dispute shall arise among a carrier's employees as to who are the representatives of such employees designated and authorized in accordance with the requirements of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the Mediation Board, upon request of
either party to the dispute, to investigate such dispute and to certify to both parties, in
writing within thirty days after the receipt of the invocation of its services, the name
or names of the individuals or organizations that have been designated and authorized
to represent the employees involved in the dispute, and certify the same to the carrier.
rd. To aid the Board in the performance of these statutory duties, Congress authorized it
"to take a secret ballot of the employees involved, or to utilize any other appropriate
method of ascertaining the names of their duly designated and authorized representatives." Id. An "appropriate method" is one that ensures that the election is free from
"interference, influence, or coercion" by the carrier. Id. The NMB is free to establish its
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employees of International In-Flight Catering Co. (11CC). 517 The NMB
then held an election. When the vote did not disclose a majority in favor
of representation, the NMB certified that the IICC's employees had no
representative. In 1975, pursuant to another request to investigate, the
NMB again found a representation dispute among the employees. This
time the NMB did not hold an election, but simply certified the Teamsters as the employees' representative on the basis of cards signed by
employees "who the record clearly show[ed] were merely requesting a
new election." '518 HCC filed suit in district court seeking to enjoin the
union and the NMB from enforcing the NMB's certification. The court
granted summary judgment in favor of 11CC. 519 On appeal, the union and
the NMB raised two key labor issues: (1) "[wlhether the district court
properly had jurisdiction to review the present dispute;" and (2)
' 520
"[w]hether IICC had standing to maintain its action."
With regard to the first issue, the defendants relied on the Supreme
Court's opinion in Switchmen's Union v. NMB 521for the proposition that
an NMB certification under section 2, Ninth is not reviewable by the
courts. The Ninth Circuit, however, distinguished Switchmen's on the
ground that in that case, the NMB had fulfilled its statutory duty5 22 to
investigate the dispute: "We find that reviewing a certification after an
investigation by the NMB and reviewing whether the NMB made its
own rules and procedures regarding employee elections, and its decisions with respect
thereto will not be reviewed by the courts in the absence of a breach of statutory
authority. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract
Employees, 380 U.S. 650, 669 (1965).
517. IICC, a Hawaiian corporation, is a subsidiary of Japan Air Lines, which operates
in the United States. 555 F.2d at 713. As a company wholly owned or controlled by a
carrier engaged in interstate commerce, IICC is itself a "carrier" as the RLA defines that
term. Id. at 713-14. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181 (1970). IICC is thus subject to the
jurisdiction of the NMB. 555 F.2d at 714. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Ninth, 181 (1970).
518. 555 F.2d at 716. The Teamsters solicited the employees by letter to sign the cards.
The letter stated, in part:
In closing, a final reminder that also enclosed is a card entitled, "Request for
Employees Representation Election Under the Railway Labor Act". By signing this
cardit does not mean that you are voting for the Union. It simply means that you are
requesting the Natiorial Mediation Board to conduct a federally supervised election.
Id. at 715 (emphasis added by the court). The court recited additional facts which
overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that the employees were told that the sole
purpose of the cards was to get a representation election. Id. at 714-16.
519. Id. at 716.
520. Id. at 717.
521. 320 U.S. 297 (1943) (4-3 decision). In Switchmen's, a union that had lost a
disputed election filed suit challenging the NMB's action in permitting all the employees to
vote. The Court did not reach the merits of the controversy, but held that the final
resolution rested with the NMB, not with the courts. Id. at 305-06. In reaching its
conclusion, the Court considered, inter alia, the language of § 2, Ninth, its legislative
history, and the fact that Congress had expressly provided for judicial review of administrative determinations under two sections of the RLA other than § 2, Ninth. Id. at 302-06.
522. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970) (partially set forth in note 516 supra).

19781

NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

statutory investigation at all are two completely different matters. While

we cannot, and do not, review the former, we can and do review the
latter. "

52 3

The court pointed out that the question at hand, which was

expressly left open in Switchmen's,524 was subsequently answered in
Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v. Association for Benefit of NonContract Employees. 525 In the latter case, the Supreme Court drew a

distinction between matters of discretion and matters of statutory duty,
and declared, "[T]he.

.

. [NMB's] action here is reviewable only to the

extent that it bears on the question of whether it performed its statutory
duty to 'investigate' the dispute.' '526
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that in the case before it, the NMB

had conducted a nominal investigation, to wit, it had compared the
employees' signatures on the cards to the signatures from IICC's payroll

records. It noted, however, that section 2, Ninth requires that the NMB
investigate the dispute.527 The IICC dispute involved the question of

whether the cards represented votes for the union or requests for an
election. "The actual investigation undertaken by the NMB in merely
comparing the signatures assumes the disputed point, that the cards
represented votes. "528
In addition, the court was clearly irritated by the NMB's steadfast

refusal to disclose any evidence as to the extent of its investigation
beyond the signature check, 529 and by "its pertinacious adherence to a
position that flatly contradicts the intended meaning of the employees
who had signed the Request for Election card, the plain language on the
card itself, and the spirit of the RLA. "530 This behavior, the court felt,

supported the conclusion that "there was no investigation, for if there
was, then the NMB would not have certified the Teamsters solely on the

basis of the Request for Election Cards. "531
523. 555 F.2d at 717 (footnote omitted).
524. Id.
525. 380 U.S. 650 (1965).
526. 555 F.2d at 718 (quoting Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of
Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. at 661). Cf. Bishop v. NLRB, 502 F.2d 1024, 1028 (5th
Cir. 1974) (courts may review the NLRB's decisions in representation matters "where
there is a 'plain' violation of an unambiguous and mandatory provision of the statute.").
527. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970) (partially set forth in note 516 supra). See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Association for Benefit of Non-Contract Employees, 380 U.S. at
661.
528. 555 F.2d at 718.
529. Id. The NMB maintained that under § 2 the scope and form of its investigations
were matters within its discretion and, thus, not reviewable by the courts. Id. However,
as Justice Reed noted in Switchmen's, "The special competence of the National Mediation Board lies in the field of labor relations rather than in that of statutory construction."
320 U.S. at 321 (Reed, J., dissenting).
530. 555 F.2d at 718-19.
531. Id. at 718. The quoted language makes it clear that the resolution of the statutory
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On the issue of standing, the NMB argued that since the policy of the
RLA sought to remove the employer from the bargaining representative
selection process,532 and since the employer has no interest in the ques34
533
tion of which representative is selected, IICC lacked standing to sue.
In response, the court pointed out that under section 2, Ninth the employer is required to "treat with" the certified bargaining representative. The
employer's failure to do so exposes him to economic sanctions such as
strikes and picketing. "11CC then is left with two choices, either 'treat
or
with' an unlawfully and improperly certified bargaining representative 535
"
choice.
fair
or
adequate
an
hardly
is
This
risk economic sanctions.
The court therefore concluded that the particular actions of the NMB
"created in IICC standing to seek judicial review on the narrow issue
decided in this case.' '536

B. FairLabor Standards Act
Hodgson v. Baker537 was the only case decided by the Ninth Circuit
during the survey period which involved wage and hour computations
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).5 38 The controversy in Baker
centered on the defendant-employer's method of computing his employees' overtime wages.
Section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA 539 requires that an employee receive
compensation for hours worked in excess of forty per week "at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular, rate at which he is employed. "540 Obviously, "the keystone of [section] 7(a) is the regular rate

of compensation." 5'

issue required consideration of the merits of the controversy. The court, however, is
curiously silent on the extent to which the merits may properly be considered in resolving
the statutory issue of whether the NMB did, in fact, investigate the dispute. It has been
suggested that the merits may be considered only where necessary and only "where the
error on the merits is as obvious on the face of the papers as the violation of specific
statutory language." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 402
F.2d 196, 205 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 848 (1968). International In-Flight
Catering seems to be just such a case.
532. See 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970). See also note 516 supra.
533. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Ninth (1970).
534. 555 F.2d at 719.
535.

Id.

536. Id.
537. 544 F.2d 429 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1581 (1977).
538. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
539. Id. § 207(a)(1) (1970).
540. Id.
541. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 (1945). See
Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460 (1948); Mumbower v. Callicott, 526
F.2d 1183, 1188 (8th Cir. 1975); Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884, 886 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967).
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In Baker, the owner of an automobile towing service had compensated
several of his employee-drivers on a commission basis, with the drivers

receiving forty-three percent of all commercial charges.542 If a driver
worked more than forty hours each week his total weekly commissions
would not be supplemented pursuant to the overtime provisions of section 7(a)(1). Instead, the employer would start with the actual compensa-

tion paid to each employee, then work backwards to derive a regular rate
and an overtime rate that would equal such compensation. When the
regular rate thus calculated exceeded the statutory minimum wage, the

employer would conclude that he had satisfied the requirements of the
FLSA.543

The Ninth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Walling
v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co. ,'4 declared that the employer's method of compensating his employees was inconsistent with "the

required method of computing the regular rate under the Act."5 s45
According to the Ninth Circuit, the correct method for computing the

regular wage for an employee paid on a commission basis is to divide the
employee's total weekly commissions by the number of hours worked
during that week. The employee should then receive overtime wages
equivalent to one and one-half times the regular rate for each hour
worked in excess of forty. 5"4

The court thus made it clear that "the act was designed to require
payment for overtime at time and a half the regular pay, where that pay is
above the minimum, as well as where the regular pay is at the
542. 544 F.2d at 431.
543. For example, if an employee had been paid $220.00 in commissions for a 50-hour
work week, the employer would compute the regular and overtime rates for that employee
by using the following formula: 40(x) +10(l1/x) = $220.00. The employer would thus
arrive at a regular rate (x) of $4.00 per hour and an overtime rate (1 l/2x) of $6.00 per hour.
Noting that the $4.00 per hour regular rate was in excess of the minimum wage mandated
by the FLSA (see 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), the employer would assume
that he had fully complied with the Act. 544 F.2d at 432.
544. 325 U.S. 419 (1945). In Walling, the Court held that when an employee's compensation is calculated by means of an "incentive pay" based on work actually completed,
the "regular rate coincides with the hourly rate actually received for all hours worked
during the particular workweek, such rate being the quotient of the amount received
during the week divided by the number of hours worked." Id. at 424.
545. 544 F.2d at 432.
546. For example, employing the hypothetical described in note 543 supra, the employee's overtime earnings would be properly calculated as follows: $220.00 + 50 hours =
$4.40 per hour (regular rate); 1 1/2 x $4.40 (overtime rate) x 10 hours = $66.00. The
employee's total compensation would be $176.00 (regular time) plus $66.00 (overtime) for
a total of $242.00. The employer would thus be required to supplement the employee's
commissions by $22.00.
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minimum." 5 4 7 This approach is consistent with that adopted by the

Supreme Court in Walling and in Overnight Motor TransportationCo.
v. Missel,548 and follows the course taken by other circuits that have
549
addressed the issue.

C.

OccupationalSafety and Health Act

The Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 550 was enacted in
1970 "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the
Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human

resources. "551 It has been described as "novel in approach ' 5 52 and as
"the most revolutionary piece of 'labor' legislation since the National
Labor Relations Act."' In essence, the Act empowers the Secretary of
Labor to adopt standards regarding workplace safety and health 5condi56
555
tions 554 to which employers governed by the Act must adhere.
The controversy in Irvington Moore v. OSHRC 557 arose out of the
apparently conflicting requirements of two such safety standards. Section
1910.212(a)(3)(ii) of 29 C.F.R. requires that "[t]he point of operation of
machines whose operation exposes an employee to injury, shall be
guarded. The guarding device.

. .

shall be so designed and constructed

as to prevent the operator from having any part of his body in the danger
zone during the operating cycle.' '558 Among the particular machines
which "usually require point of operation guarding" are "power pres547. 544 F.2d at 433 (quoting Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 578
(1942)).
548. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
549. See, e.g., Mumbower v. Callicott, 526 F.2d 1183, 1187 (8th Cir. 1975) (employee
paid on weekly salary basis); Triple "AAA" Co. v. Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884, 887 (10th Cir.),
cert denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967) (employee paid flat monthly salary for worksheet
averaging more than 40 hours); Moretti, Inc. v. Boogers, 376 F.2d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1967)
(employee's work week fluctuated from 37-52 hours).
550. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
551. Id. § 651.
552. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
553. White & Carney, OSHA Comes of Age: The Law of Work Place Environment, 28
Bus. LAW. 1309, 1309 (1973).
554. See 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970).
555. See id. § 652(5).
556. See id. § 654(a)(2). Courts have held that in enacting the OSHA Congress intended
to exercise the full extent of its authority under the commerce clause of the Constitution.
Godwin v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d 1013, 1015 (9th Cir. 1976). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3;
29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970). Consequently, the Act, with but a few exceptions, see 29 U.S.C.
§§ 652(5), 653(b)(1) (1970), applies to every employer whose business affects interstate
commerce. Godwin v. OSHRC, 540 F.2d at 1015.
557. 556 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1977).
558. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(3)(ii) (1976). A machine's "point of operation" is "the
area on a machine where work is actually performed upon the material being processed."
Id. § 1910.212(a)(3)(i).
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of which one type is the press brake. 56 ° On the other hand,

section 1910.217, which sets forth detailed safety standards governing

"mechanical power presses," 56 1expressly excludes press brakes from its
requirements.562
Following a routine OSHA plant inspection, 563 Irvington Moore was

cited for operating press brakes without point of operation guarding, in
contravention of section 1910.212(a)(3)(ii). At a subsequent hearing
before the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission

(OSHRC) ,4 Irvington Moore argued that the express exclusion of press
brakes from the detailed requirements of section 1910.217 meant that

press brakes were exempt from any point of operation guarding requirements whatsoever. In support of this position, the company cited section
1910.5(c)(1), 561 which provides that an applicable "particular standard"
governs over any "general standard" which might otherwise apply. The
OSHRC, however, found the company in violation of the regulations. It
held that section 1910.217(a)(5) excludes press brakes from the require-

ments of section 1910.217 only, and not from the coverage of section
1910.212(a)(3) which, by its terms, applies to power presses. 5 6 Irvington Moore was fined $350,567 and it petitioned the Ninth Circuit for
review.

568

Before the Ninth Circuit, the company again argued that section
1910.217 must override the less specific section 1910.212, and that

section 1910.217's explicit exclusion of press brakes from its coverage
meant that no point of operation guarding was required. 6 9 The court, in a

sensible and well-reasoned opinion, rejected this argument on several
grounds. It first noted that the rule urged by the company "can hardly
mean that a section from which press brakes are entirely excluded should
559. Id. § 1910.212(a)(3)(iv)(d).
560. 556 F.2d at 432-33. "A press brake is a machine that bends and shapes pieces of
metal which are placed between the two dies." Id. at 432.
561. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.217 (1976).
562. See id. § 1910.217(a)(5).
563. See 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1970).
564. The OSHRC was established under id. § 661.
565. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c)(1) (1976).
566. See 3 O.S.H.C. 1018 (1975).
567. 556 F.2d at 434. Another company, Gem Top Mfg., Inc., was cited and fined for
the same violations as Irvington Moore, and the two cases were consolidated before the
Ninth Circuit. For convenience, in this discussion only Irvington Moore will be mentioned. The two companies presented the same arguments to the court.
568. See generally 29 U.S.C. § 660 (1970).
569. 556 F.2d at 435. The company's reliance on 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c)(1) (1976) in
support of this argument was perhaps misplaced. That section provides that particular
standards which are "specifically applicable" to a situation "shall prevail over any
different general standard." (Emphasis added). Inasmuch as § 1910.217 specifically ex-
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preempt a section under which press brakes are clearly covered.' '570 In
support of this conclusion, the court cited section 655(a) of 29 U.S.C.,
"which mandates application of the standard that assures the greatest
protection for employees." 57' In addition, the court relied on the "general canon of statutory construction that remedial statutes are to be liberally
construed in favor of their beneficiaries. "572
The company also argued that the existence of the conflicting standards was misleading and resulted in a lack of fair notice as to what
conduct or equipment was required. 57 3 The court declared that this
complaint was "not credible" 5 74 in light of section 654(a)(1) of 29
U.S.C. (the "general duty" clause) which requires each employer to
furnish his employees with "employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or likely to cause
5 75
death or serious physical harm to his employees.
Finally, the company argued that to interpret section 1910.212 as
requiring point of operation guarding on press brakes when press brakes
were specifically excluded from section 1910.217 was illogical, and
would render the section 1910.217 exclusion meaningless.576 However,
cludes press brakes from its coverage, it can hardly be called applicableto such machines.
The court, however, did not raise this point. Nor did the court cite 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c)(2)
(1976), which provides that "any standard shall apply according to its terms . . . to the
extent that none of [the) particular standards applies."
570. 556 F.2d at 435.
571. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 655(a) (1970)). See Brennan v. OSHRC, 491 F.2d 1340, 1343
(2d Cir. 1974) (standards should be construed to effectuate purposes of OSHA). While the
court's construction of § 655(a) is unquestionably consistent with the underlying policies
of the Act, the court may have been reading too much into the section. By its language, the
section deals not with application but rather with promulgation of standards by the
Secretary of Labor.
572. 556 F.2d at 435. See Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945); American
Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 511 (8th Cir. 1974).
573. 556 F.2d at 435. One court has stated: "An employer. . . is entitled to fair notice
in dealing with his government. . . . [A]n occupational safety and health standard must
give an employer fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires, and it must provide a
reasonably clear standard of culpability to circumscribe the discretion of the enforcing
authority..... " Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1976).
574. 556 F.2d at 435.
575. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970). In IrvingtonMoore, evidence and testimony that had
been presented to the Commission left no doubt that the operation of the company's press
brake without a point of operation guard constituted a "recognized hazard." See 556 F.2d
at 433. Accord, Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196, 1201 (7th Cir. 1974) (employer must
protect employees from recognized hazards); cf. Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co.,
520 F.2d 1011, 1017-18 n. 1 (7th Cir. 1975) (specific promulgated standards preempt general
duty clause, but only with respect to hazards expressly covered by the specific standards);
American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504,512 (8th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he use of
the general duty clause ordinarily should not be available when a specific standard has
been promulgated.").
576. 556 F.2d at 435-36.
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the court correctly observed that inasmuch as section 1910.217 "instructs the employer as to what safety devices he must install, [while]
section .212 is a 'performance' standard which allows him more flexibility," 5 77 the inclusion of press brakes under one section but not the other
was not unreasonable.
Judge Wright, in dissent, agreed with the company's argument that
opinion failed to address
fair notice had been denied. However, his brief
5 78
majority.
the
by
cited
clause
the general duty
Robert H. Dewbeny
Mitchell C. Tilner

577. Id. at 436.
578. See note 575 supra and a'ccompanying text.

